


1974

## 29. Book VII, Vol. 5: Domestic surveillance activities directed by the White House.

Don Edwards

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67. On August 25, 1971 Hunt requested and received from the CIA alias identification and disguise material for Liddy and a camera concealed in a tobacco pouch. Later that day Hunt and Liddy flew to Los Angeles for the purpose of obtaining information about Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers disclosure. While in Los Angeles Hunt and Liddy sought to determine the feasibility of an operation to gain access to Dr. Fielding's files. Hunt and Liddy took photographs of the interior and exterior of Dr. Fielding's office. Upon Hunt's return from Los Angeles on either August 26 or 27, 1971 a CIA employee met Hunt at the airport, had the film processed and returned the prints to Hunt the same day. Hunt and Liddy showed the photographs to Krogh and Young and reported that a surreptitious entry was feasible.

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- 67.1 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3774.
- 67.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 7, 1973, 253; 275-76 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 67.3 CIA employee affidavit, May 9, 1973 and letter from John Warner to William Merrill, September 5, 1973 (received from CIA).
- 67.4 E. Howard Hunt testimony, SSC Executive Session, June 12, 1973, 270 (received from SSC).
- 67.5 John Ehrlichman testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 558 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 67.6 Egil Krogh testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 30-32.
- 67.7 David Young testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, August 22, 1973, 45-52.



68. On August 26, 1971 Young sent a memorandum to Ehrlichman stating that the plan was to develop slowly a negative picture around the whole Pentagon study affair (preparation to publication) and to identify Ellsberg's associates and supporters on the new left with this negative image. The memorandum referred to material to be developed from the present Hunt/Liddy Project #1. The memo stated that it would be absolutely essential to have an overall game plan developed for its use in conjunction with a Congressional investigation. On the following day Ehrlichman sent a memorandum to Colson requesting a game plan for the use of materials obtained from Hunt/Liddy Special Project #1.

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- 68.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2551.
- 68.2 Memorandum from David Young to John Ehrlichman, August 26, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 91, 6 SSC 2646-50.
- 68.3 Memorandum from John Ehrlichman to Charles Colson, August 27, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 91, 6 SSC 2651.
- 68.4 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3675.
- 68.5 Charles Colson testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 648-49 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).

69. On August 27, 1971 CIA Deputy Director Cushman telephoned Ehrlichman to request that Hunt be restrained in his requests to the CIA for further assistance. Hunt had requested from the CIA such items as a stenographer, credit cards, and an office in New York with a phone listed in New York that could be monitored in Washington. Ehrlichman agreed that the CIA need not meet Hunt's additional requests.

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- 69.1 Robert Cushman testimony, 8 SSC 3293-94.
- 69.2 Memorandum for the record, August 30, 1971 and routing slip, August 31, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 122, 8 SSC 3377-79.
- 69.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, Executive Session, May 30, 1973, 239 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).
- 69.4 CIA employee affidavit, May 18, 1973 (received from CIA).

70. Krogh and Young have testified that they telephoned Ehrlichman at Cape Cod on or about August 30, 1971 and reported that Hunt and Liddy had returned from California and reported that a covert operation could be undertaken and would not be traceable. Ehrlichman gave his approval. Ehrlichman has testified that he does not recall receiving this telephone call.

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- 70.1 Egil Krogh testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 47-48.
  - 70.2 David Young testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, August 22, 1973, 57-59.
  - 70.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2548.
  - 70.4 John Ehrlichman log, August 29-September 5, 1971 (received from SSC).



71. Prior to September 2, 1971 either Krogh (according to Krogh) or Ehrlichman (according to Colson) requested Colson to obtain \$5,000. The money was to be used to finance the Fielding operation. Colson requested Joseph Baroody, a Washington public relations consultant, to deliver \$5,000 to Krogh who turned it over to Liddy. Several weeks later Colson caused Baroody to be repaid with \$5,000 from a political contribution by a dairy industry political organization.

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- 71.1 Charles Colson testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 651-56 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 71.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 552-53 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 71.3 Egil Krogh testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 32-35.
- 71.4 David Young testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, August 22, 1973, 77-80.
- 71.5 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3774.
- 71.6 Joseph Baroody affidavit, January 30, 1974 (received from SSC).
- 71.7 George Webster deposition, Common Cause v. Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, December 24, 1973, 33-35.
- 71.8 Marion Harrison testimony, SSC Executive Session, December 4, 1973, 43-45 (received from SSC).

72. On or about September 2, 1971 Hunt and Liddy flew to Chicago where they purchased cameras and walkie-talkies. Then they flew to Los Angeles where they met Barker, Martinez and DeDiego and purchased a crow bar, glass cutter, and other burglary tools. On the night of September 3, 1971, Barker, Martinez and DeDiego entered Dr. Fielding's office by breaking a first floor window of the building and breaking open the door to Dr. Fielding's second floor office. The file cabinets and desk in Dr. Fielding's office were broken into and searched. Liddy maintained a watch outside the building while Hunt, who was in communication by walkie-talkie, watched Dr. Fielding's residence. Barker, Martinez and DeDiego have testified that they did not locate any file on Ellsberg and that no information was obtained. Dr. Fielding has testified that his file cabinet had been broken into and the file on Ellsberg withdrawn.

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- 72.1 Bernard Barker testimony, 1 SSC 376.
- 72.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1973, 291-92, 298-99, 301-02 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.3 Felipe DeDiego testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1973, 191-99 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.4 Eugenio Martinez testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 5, 1973, 390 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.5 Lewis Fielding testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 5, 1973, 93-94 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.6 Lewis Fielding affidavit, United States v. Russo, April 29, 1973.



73. On or about September 7, 1971 Hunt and Liddy delivered reports to Krogh and Young which included photographs of the physical damage to Dr. Fielding's office. Hunt and Liddy recommended a further operation to seek the files at Dr. Fielding's home. Krogh reported these facts to Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman has testified that the action far exceeded the authorization he had given and disapproved any further covert activity. On the same day Hunt testified that he sought to discuss the entry into Fielding's office with Colson. Colson testified he declined to discuss the matter.

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- 73.1 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1973, 307-14 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 73.2 Egil Krogh testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 40-47.
- 73.3 David Young testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, August 23, 1973, 92-99.
- 73.4 John Ehrlichman testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 549-50, 586-88 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 73.5 Charles Colson testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 660-61 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).

74. At 10:45 a.m. on September 8, 1971 Ehrlichman met with Krogh and Young and they discussed the Fielding break-in. At 1:45 that afternoon Ehrlichman telephoned the President and between 3:26 p.m. and 5:10 p.m. Ehrlichman met with the President. Ehrlichman has testified that he did not tell the President about the Fielding break-in. On September 10, 1971 Ehrlichman met with the President from 3:03 to 3:51 p.m. and at 4:00 p.m. Ehrlichman met with Krogh and Young.

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- 74.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 604 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
  - 74.2 Meetings and conversations between the President and John Ehrlichman, September 8 and September 10, 1971 (received from White House).
  - 74.3 John Ehrlichman log, September 8 and September 10, 1971 (received from SSC).
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75. In August or September 1971, Caulfield submitted to John Dean a written proposal for a political intelligence operation entitled Operation Sandwedge with a budget of \$511,000. The proposal specified both clandestine offensive and defensive operations, including a black bag capability. The budget included an item of \$15,000 for Equipment Electronic Surveillance. During September and October 1971, Strachan informed Haldeman that the proposal had been considered by Dean and Attorney General Mitchell. Haldeman instructed Strachan to arrange a meeting with Mitchell to discuss pending matters including the Sandwedge plan. On November 4, 1971 Haldeman, Mitchell, Magruder and Strachan discussed the plan. Operation Sandwedge was never instituted. On November 24, 1971 Mitchell discussed with Caulfield a position at CRP.

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- 75.1 Operation Sandwedge proposal, Summer 1971, 5-6 (received from SSG).
- 75.2 Proposed Budget of Operation Sandwedge, SSC Exhibit No. 34-9, 3 SSC 1121-23.
- 75.3 John Dean testimony, 3 SSC 924-26.
- 75.4 John Caulfield testimony, SSC Executive Session, March 16, 1974, 108-110.
- 75.5 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman, September 24, 1971 (received from White House).
- 75.6 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman, October 7, 1971 (received from White House).



- 75.7 Gordon Strachan testimony, SSC Executive Session, July 12, 1973, 26-27, 61.
- 75.8 John Mitchell testimony, 4 SSC 1605.
- 75.9 John Mitchell log, November 4 and 24, 1971 (received from SSC).
- 75.10 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman, December 2, 1971 (received from White House).

76.1 United States v. Segretti, Indictment, September 27, 1971.

76.2 United States v. Segretti, Docket.

76.3 Letter drafted on Mark's stationery, SSC Exhibit No. 386, 13 SSC 4245.

76.4 Exhibit 25, United States v. Chapin, April 2, 1972, 327-29.

76.5 E. Howard Ross memorandum, 9 SSC 3742-43.

76.6 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2438-39.

76.7 Ross's Segretti testimony, 10 SSC 3994, 3995.

76. Between September 1971 and June 16, 1972 Donald Segretti hired operatives to infiltrate the campaigns of various Democratic candidates, placed Senator Edmund Muskie under physical surveillance, disrupted campaign activities, and printed false and scurrilous materials attributed to various Democratic candidates. These publications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 612, were mailed by Segretti to Dwight Chapin, the President's appointments secretary. During this same period, CRP employed individuals to infiltrate the Muskie, Humphrey and McGovern campaign staffs. These individuals were assigned code names such as Sedan Chair II and Fat Jack and supplied documents and intelligence information about the Democratic campaigns. Strachan has testified that a Sedan Chair II report was included in a Political Matters Memorandum sent by Strachan to Haldeman.

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76.1 United States v. Segretti, Indictment, September 27, 1973.

76.2 United States v. Segretti, Docket.

76.3 Letter drafted on Muskie stationery, SSC Exhibit No. 206, 10 SSC 4280.

76.4 Exhibit 25, United States v. Chapin, April 2, 1974, 327-29.

76.5 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3742-43.

76.6 Gordon Strachan testimony, 6 SSC 2458-59.

76.7 Donald Segretti testimony, 10 SSC 3994, 3997.



77. On November 1, 1971, John Ehrlichman was informed by Egil Krogh and David Young in a memorandum that the prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg would be more difficult because (1) Ellsberg gave classified information to the press, not to a foreign power, (2) a few months after Ellsberg went public, the Department of Defense published virtually the same materials, and (3) there had been no apparent damage as a result of Ellsberg's disclosures.

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77.1 Memorandum from Egil Krogh and David Young to John Ehrlichman, November 1, 1971 with attachment (received from White House).

78. Prior to November 9, 1971 members of the Plumbers Unit had conversed with the CIA staff psychiatrist who had directed the preparation of the Ellsberg psychological profile, and had sent materials to the CIA to be used in the development of that profile. On November 9, 1971 CIA Director Richard Helms wrote to David Young stating that the CIA's involvement in preparation of the Ellsberg profile should not be revealed in any context. On November 12, 1971 the CIA delivered to the Plumbers an expanded psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg.

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78.1 CIA staff psychiatrist affidavit, May 9, 1973 (received from SSC).

78.2 Memoranda among CIA employees, November 9 and November 8, 1971 (received from CIA).

78.3 Letter from Richard Helms to David Young, November 9, 1971 (received from CIA).

78.4 CIA document on Daniel Ellsberg delivered to David Young in early November 1971 (received from CIA).

79. On December 14, 1971, after publication in a newspaper column of facts about the U. S. position on the India-Pakistan War, Krogh and Young were assigned to investigate the disclosure. Krogh was dropped from the Unit on December 20, 1971 after he refused to authorize specific wiretaps. Subsequently, four FBI wiretaps were authorized and instituted, and Young pursued the investigation that coincidentally uncovered the fact that classified documents were being passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the military liaison office at the National Security Council in the White House. The FBI files contain no written instructions or authorization from either the Attorney General or the White House. The records of these taps were kept completely isolated from regular FBI files, and they were not entered in the electronic surveillance indices. Young rendered a report on the investigation in early January 1972, but the taps continued past that date, the last being terminated June 20, 1972. The liaison office was abolished.

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79.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2556.

79.2 Henry Kissinger testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 6, 1974, 48-49.

79.3 Fred Buzhardt testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 7, 1974, 9, 14-16, 19.

79.4 Washington Post articles, December 13 and December 14, 1971.

79.5 Egil Krogh statement, January 3, 1974, 7.

79.6 E. S. Miller interview, FBI, May 10, 1973, 3, with attachment dated February 26, 1973 (received from Department of Justice).



80. On or about December 14, 1971 Gordon Liddy left the White House staff to become counsel to CRP and then later to FCRP.

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80.1 Memorandum from Gordon Strachan to H. R. Haldeman,  
December 6, 1971 (received from White House).

81. On December 29, 1971, a fifteen count indictment of Daniel Ellsberg was filed alleging violations of the conspiracy statutes, and statutes prohibiting the unauthorized distribution of classified information and misappropriation of government property. No counts were included alleging the transmission of documents to a foreign country or representatives of a foreign country because evidence was not developed to support such a charge.

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81.1 U. S. v. Russo, Indictment, December 29, 1971.

81.2 David Nissen affidavit in response to oral interrogatories, March 14, 1974, 27-28.





67. On August 25, 1971 Hunt requested and received from the CIA alias identification and disguise material for Liddy and a camera concealed in a tobacco pouch. Later that day Hunt and Liddy flew to Los Angeles for the purpose of obtaining information about Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers disclosure. While in Los Angeles Hunt and Liddy sought to determine the feasibility of an operation to gain access to Dr. Fielding's files. Hunt and Liddy took photographs of the interior and exterior of Dr. Fielding's office. Upon Hunt's return from Los Angeles on either August 26 or 27, 1971 a CIA employee met Hunt at the airport, had the film processed and returned the prints to Hunt the same day. Hunt and Liddy showed the photographs to Krogh and Young and reported that a surreptitious entry was feasible.

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**PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972**  
**SENATE RESOLUTION 60**

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**HEARINGS**  
BEFORE THE  
**SELECT COMMITTEE ON**  
**PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES**  
OF THE  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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**WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES**

**Phase I: Watergate Investigation**

WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973

**Book 9**



Printed for the use of the  
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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WASHINGTON : 1973

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Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price \$3

Senator WEICKER. You initially notified—

Mr. HUNT [continuing]. For our reconnaissance stay.

Senator WEICKER. I see.

Did you give a date certain as to when they should come to Los Angeles at that time or did you call from Los Angeles and request their presence?

Mr. HUNT. No, sir; the procedure was a little more complicated than that. Mr. Liddy and I returned from Los Angeles on or about August 27. We submitted a report of our findings and rather a detailed study which included photographs which had been developed for us and printed by the CIA, both internal and external photographs. There was a period of waiting while this report was being considered by Mr. Krogh and I now understand others.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, the preliminary report was submitted to Mr. Krogh.

Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. And when you say others who would that include?

Mr. HUNT. I assumed then and I assume now that Mr. Ehrlichman was also considering the report inasmuch as our findings were that a secure entry could be made and in fact was.

Senator WEICKER. Then who gave the final authorization to proceed with the actual break-in? You say you returned to Washington?

Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. While these photographs were being developed, while consultation took place, and on whose instructions then did you return to Los Angeles for the actual break-in?

Mr. HUNT. Well, Mr. Liddy told me "It is go, you have got the green light."

I then communicated with my assistants in Florida and told them to be in Los Angeles at the Beverly Hilton Hotel, on a date certain, where we would converge and I would give them details of the operation, which they did not have at that point.

In addition there was a question of money, of financing. A certain budget had been drawn up. We reached a point when Mr. Liddy and I were waiting in room 16 for the funds for the operation to be produced.

Senator WEICKER. Room 16 being in the White House?

Mr. HUNT. The Plumbers room in the old Executive Office Building.

Senator WEICKER. In the old Executive Office Building.

Mr. HUNT. And time was growing very short in terms of the departure of our scheduled aircraft.

Almost at the last minute Mr. Krogh came in very hurriedly and handed an envelope to Mr. Liddy and said, "OK, here it is. Get going."

Mr. Liddy took the money, we left, took a taxi, went to the airport, flew to Chicago, made certain photographic purchases out there, overnight in Chicago. In the morning we flew to Los Angeles where we met with the men who had flown directly there from Miami.

Senator WEICKER. At the meeting at the Beverly Hilton Hotel then with the four Cuban-Americans, prior to their appearing in Los Angeles, they did not know the nature of the mission?

Mr. HUNT. They did not know the target of the mission.





People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

E. Howard Hunt

June 6, 1973

Q How did that come about?

A The request -- to go back to the origin of the material request, Mr. Hecht, I had made the request of Mr. Colson, and Mr. Liddy had no connection with the work that I was doing, conducting for Mr. Colson; so that the issuance of the material was made to me solely.

Subsequently, when the entry operation out here was decided upon, Liddy indicated that -- and I certainly agreed with him -- that it would be great if he, too, could be similarly supplied.

Do you want me to continue, Mr. Hecht?

Q Yes, please.

A I never reconsulted General Cushman. I never discussed it with Mr. Colson. I simply called my contact in the Technical Services Division of Central Intelligence Agency and said that there was another White House official who would be working with me on an unidentified activity; and that precisely the same items that had been issued me, I would require for issuance to him.

Q And did that in fact come about?

A That did.

Q Were you ever told by anyone that Mr. Ehrlichman had allegedly called Mr. Cushman prior to your visiting with him?

A We are talking about 1961?

Q '71.

A '71?

Q Yes, sir.



1 your recommendation was and your findings out here, is that  
2 correct?

3 A Yes, sir.

4 Q Did you do that, or Mr. Liddy do that?

5 A To the best of my recollection it was a joint  
6 effort in which I supplied perhaps 75 per cent of the written  
7 material.

8 Q And were these memoranda that were prepared?

9 A Not memoranda as such, sir; that is to say they  
10 had no heading "To" and "From". They were just simply a  
11 series of related paragraphs on different aspects of the  
12 operation.

13 Q What was your expectation at the time as to who  
14 that recommendation would be forwarded to?

15 A To Mr. Krogh.

16 Q What did you base that expectation on?

17 A Inasmuch as Mr. Krogh was the guiding personality of  
18 our unit.

19 Q Did it ever come to your attention that that  
20 recommendation had in fact been sent on to Mr. Krogh, so  
21 to speak?

22 A Inferentially.

23 Q Did you discuss orally with Mr. Krogh, when you  
24 got back to Washington, what had happened out here in Los  
25 Angeles?

26 A I recall discussing it with Mr. Young. I believe  
27 Mr. Liddy personally discussed it with Mr. Krogh, though I  
may very well have.

Q When did you discuss it with Mr. Young?

A Immediately upon our return.

Q Where did that discussion take place?

A Room 16.

Q Will you tell us, please, the substance of that discussion?

A I had the prints, the memorandum was in the process of being typed up.

I think I said to Mr. Young words to the effect "I think we have a perfect situation here for a clandestine surreptitious entry."

Q What if anything did Mr. Young say?

A "Good."

5701

70 P277

Q What led you to the conclusion that you have just given us that it was Mr. Liddy who discussed the trip out here with Mr. Krogh?

A Because I don't recall discussing it with Mr. Krogh in any detail.

Q Okay. Did you ever see the report that was made up in its final form after it was typed?

A I would say yes to that.

Q And --

A I would have gone over it for typos, certainly, yes.

Q Do you know what happened to it after you went over it?

A I believe the last time I saw it it was in the physical possession of Mr. Liddy, that is to say lying in his

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# IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY DV

Vol 9-CIA

DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED BY CIA

1 June 1973

VOLUME I

DV



SECRET

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF VIRGINIA )  
 ) ss.  
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX)

I, | 10 being first duly sworn, state:

1. I was born on | am a graduate of the  
State College of | and have been an employee of the  
Central Intelligence Agency since August 1969.

2. On 22 July 1971 I was in the parking lot behind the Technical  
Services Division's South Building facility at about 5:10 p.m. when I was  
called to Mr. | // who was the Acting Chief of Technical  
Services Division. Mr. | // told me that I was to report to Mr. |  
| office the following morning and pick up keys for a safehouse  
meeting with one person. This pertained to a request from the White  
House for our services. I was to support a man, unknown to me, for non-  
backstopped U.S. alias documentation and disguise material. He said this  
was a sensitive case. At that time my Section Chief, who was also present,  
asked if we could obtain a physical description of this individual for the  
possible use of a mustache, glasses, wigs, etc. Mr. | // made a  
telephone call to someone and received the physical description of the man.  
This was of great assistance because later on that night I packed up dis-  
guise materials for the safehouse meeting. I was instructed to get bio data  
from this man for the non-backstopped U.S. alias documentation and I was  
to telephone this bio data to my Section Chief. He would, in turn, turn this  
information over to | 12 who would prepare the non-backstop-  
ped U.S. alias documentation made up for the individual. I was not given

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any specifics as to what type of operation this was or what the requirements were.

3. On 23 July 1971 I met this man at the safehouse after first having gone to the Headquarters Building and obtained the keys from [ ] 13 I programmed the subject for a wig, glasses and a speech alteration device. He gave me the name of Edward J. Warren to use as the alias name. At the same time I telephoned in his bio data, such as date of birth, height, weight, color of hair, etc., to my Section Chief, "Edward" made mention of the fact that he wanted all of this that same afternoon; he then left. My Section Chief delivered the non-backstopped U.S. alias documentation late that afternoon and departed. "Edward" then returned. I gave him the documentation and the disguise materials. He seemed quite satisfied and said that if he needed any additional assistance he would be in contact with me. I gave him my Agency telephone number. I then went back to TSD the next morning, Saturday, 24 July 1971, and briefed Mr. [ ] // on all the support I had given "Edward".

4. About a week later I was requested to adjust "Edward's" glasses and also bring with me someone who could deliver a tape recorder. At this second meeting I gave "Edward" some non-backstopped business cards which I had picked up at the Chief/TSD's office prior to this meeting. At this second meeting "Edward" asked for a second speech alteration device. I believe he requested a backstopped New York address and telephone number. Possibly as early as the second meeting, "Edward" also expressed an interest in credit cards, simply for identification purposes. My answer was that we did not issue credit cards. "Edward" said he also

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wanted a second man disguised and non-backstopped U.S. alias documentation provided at that later meeting. I then returned to TSD and briefed Mr. | II and Mr. | 12 on the upcoming documents required.

5. At a third meeting I met "Edward" and an associate at another safehouse. At this time I disguised the second individual for glasses and a wig and telephoned the second individual's bio data to my Section Chief. "Edward" at this meeting requested a concealment camera, film and training in this device. "Edward" said he needed this that same day because he and the other person were leaving on a trip that afternoon. I contacted Mr. | II and he in turn referred me to the Chief, Photo Branch. As a result of this, the concealment camera and non-backstopped U.S. alias documentation for the second man was delivered that afternoon by | 14.

Mr. | 14 instructed the second man in the use of the concealment camera. I was working in the safehouse on the second individual when Mr. | 14 brought the concealment camera. The second man said he had to be at the Pentagon before he made his airport connection that evening. "Edward" asked for my home telephone number and said he would call me there and let me know when he was coming into the Washington area so he could have the film developed. I gave him my home telephone number which is | "Edward" said he would call me at my residence and give me instructions for the pickup once the film had been exposed. I telephoned Mr. | II at his residence about this and he said I was to keep him advised on any developments on the case.

6. On 23 August 1971 I received a call at my residence from "Edward" asking that I meet him and the second man at Dulles Airport at

SECRET

SECRET

6:30 in the morning to pick up the film. On that same evening I telephoned Mr. | // at his residence and told him "Edward" had been in contact via long distance. Mr. | // told me in turn to contact Mr. | // at his home and tell him I would be bringing in the film for early development on the 24th of August.

7. The fourth meeting with "Edward" was on 24 August 1971 at Dulles Airport. At this meeting I picked up the film and camera in a tobacco pouch from "Edward". He also asked again about credit cards. I told him again we did not issue credit cards. "Edward" said he needed the film negatives and prints the same day. It was at this meeting that "Edward" said something to the second man about drugs. I do not know exactly what it was he said but there was the mention of drugs. I gave the film to Mr. | // at TSD/Photo and discussed the case with Mr. | // It was at this meeting that Mr. | // said these men were not operating under our supervision and Headquarters did not know what they were up to. Mr. | // gave me specific orders to show him the pictures before I delivered them to "Edward" that afternoon. He also dictated a list of things I was to tell "Edward" at the afternoon meeting.

a. There was to be a delay in additional support until my superiors received further authorization from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence with regard to the request for the camera, backstopped documents or any so far unrequested audio surveillance activity other than the commercial tape recorder already provided.

b. No backstopped documents can be provided unless requested through the Office of the Director.

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c. Loan of the camera requested was to be a one-time affair.

d. We would continue to assist "Edward" in terms of notional alias documentation, servicing or maintaining his disguise and tape recorder.

e. Request that all of the documents issued, particularly those of his associate, identified in alias as "George" at this time, be returned as soon after use as possible.

f. That "Mr. Edward" should not press Mr. [ ] /o for anything additional since Mr. [ ] /o supervisors were not authorized to supply additional support.

g. None of the above was to preclude additional support if it were properly authorized by the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

[ ] Later that afternoon I delivered the film negatives and prints to "Edward" at a safehouse and started to go through the listed items I was to tell him. I got perhaps halfway through the list when "Edward" seemed in a hurry and said if that was the way we wanted it, he would straighten it out. Incidentally, I had Xeroxed copies of the prints before I delivered them to "Edward". As late possibly as the first of September 1971, I had not heard anything from "Edward". One evening he called at my residence asking once again for credit cards. I again stated Agency policy would not permit issuance of credit cards and at the same time told him I had not received further authorization from my superiors to continue support for him and his colleague.

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8. On 14 or 15 October 1971, Chief/TSD | Dr. 15

called me to his office and told me General Cushman was going to have lunch with "Edward" the following day and he wanted a complete briefing on the case for General Cushman's benefit, which I gave him. At this meeting I gave | Dr. 15 a Xeroxed copy I had of the photographs that "Edward" and his colleague had taken.

9. I did not know the identity of either "Edward" or his colleague until it was published in the newspapers after the Watergate incident.

10  
Affiant.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before

me this 9th day of May, 1973.

✓  
A Notary Public in and for the County of Fairfax, Virginia.


My Commission Expires: My Commission Expires March 15, 1977

SECRET

DA

CIA

RECEIVED APRIL 10, 1974  
TITLED "2<sup>ND</sup> Volume 1, Citi"





CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20335

5 September 1973

William H. Merrill, Esq.  
Assistant Special Prosecutor  
Watergate Special Prosecution Force  
1425 "K" Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20005

Dear Bill:

On 7 August 1973 you asked me to verify the date CIA developed films for Howard Hunt. On 8 August I advised you orally that paragraph 6 of [10] affidavit containing 24 August 1971 was the accurate date and that paragraph 11 of [11] affidavit was wrong. I regret to inform you that my conclusions were in error and that the date the films were developed is 27 August 1971.

A review of Agency files and records has uncovered a chronology prepared by [10] on 5 December 1972 and a chronology prepared by [10] on 14 October 1971, copies enclosed. It should be noted in the chronology that the term "bigot" is used which identifies Howard Hunt as the subject to receive the technical assistance and since it was a sensitive case, a "bigot list" was maintained as to who had contact with Hunt. There is also an additional source of confirmation and that is Howard Hunt's testimony before the Grand Jury 2 May 1973. Mr. Campbell, Assistant U. S. Attorney, states in a question to Mr. Hunt: "On 25 August you and Mr. Liddy traveled to Los Angeles and registered at the Beverly Hilton Hotel." Mr. Hunt answered: "That must be it. In any event, we were authorized to make a preliminary vulnerability and feasibility study for such an operation." Also memoranda written by [13] on 26 August 1971 and 30 August 1971 recounting conversations with Mr. [11] concerning support given by TSD to Howard Hunt.

From a careful review of the above mentioned documents the sequence of events appear to be as follows:


a. 25 August 1971 Hunt and Liddy met in a safehouse with 10 . 10 received the information for Liddy's alias documentation and telephoned this into his branch chief. At this same meeting, Hunt requested a concealed camera. 10 asked 11 via telephone for this support and arrangements were made for 14 to deliver the camera and the alias documentation to the safehouse. 14 arrived and instructed Liddy on the use of the camera and gave him his alias documents. Hunt said he and Liddy were going to catch a plane. This would tie in with Hunt's Grand Jury testimony that he registered at the Beverly Hilton Hotel on 25 August 1971.

b. 26 August 1971 11 had conversations with 13 reporting additional requests in which 13 advised 13 that Hunt had now asked for a disguise and documents for a second individual (Liddy) and also requested a concealed camera per 13 memo prepared contemporaneously. Late in the evening of 26 August 10 received a telephone call from Hunt at his residence and Hunt requested 10 to meet him at Dulles Airport at 6:30 a.m., 27 August 1971.

c. 27 August 1971 10 met Hunt at Dulles Airport on Friday morning, 27 August 1971, and received from Hunt the camera concealed in a tobacco pouch and a roll of exposed film. Hunt requested immediate development of the film and asked that the negatives and one print of each picture be delivered to him that day. 10 agreed to meet Hunt at a safehouse later that morning. The roll of film was developed and a single print was made in accordance with Hunt's instructions. However, a Xerox copy of the prints was made for the TSD files.

Before, 10 left for his meeting with Hunt to deliver the prints, 11 asked to see the prints and asked the technicians to further identify the name on the parking space in one of the pictures. This name was later inked in on the Xerox copy as Dr. Fielding. Later in the day of the 27th of August, 1971, 11 talked to 13 and told him that the film had been developed and prints delivered to Hunt. 13 wrote up this conversation in his memorandum of 30 August 1971.

Sincerely,

  
John S. Warner  
Acting General Counsel

Enclosure





Vol.

81. 179-281

The United States Senate

COPY 1 OF 3 COPIES

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 -- GENERAL INVESTIGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Tuesday, June 12, 1973

Washington, D. C.

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WARD & PAUL  
410 FIRST STREET, N. E.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

nation. I requested that a camera would be made available which could be used for internal photography, that in fact was made available to Mr. Liddy. It was a Tosina Camera, concealed -- in a tobacco pouch. Mr. Liddy was given instructions on its operation and use. In due course we returned it to the Central Intelligence.

Mr. Armstrong. Do you know what Mr. Liddy used that camera for?

Mr. Hunt. Of course.

Mr. Armstrong. What was that for, sir?

Mr. Hunt. For internal photography in the professional premises of Dr. Louis [sic] Fielding in Beverly Hills, California.

Mr. Armstrong. Was it ever used on any other occasions?

Mr. Hunt. No, not to my knowledge.

Mr. Armstrong. At what point was that returned to the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. It was returned immediately upon our return from our initial reconnaissance. The camera was constructed in such a way that it was pre-loaded by CIA technicians; we had no way of entering it to take out a cassette [sic] of film. The entire object had to be returned to the CIA; we never saw it again.

They took the film out of it, developed the film, processed them, printed them, and returned them to me. I never saw the camera again.



1 nation. I requested that a camera would be made available which  
2 could be used for internal photography. That in fact was made  
3 available to Mr. Liddy. It was a Weston camera, mounted  
4 in a tobacco pouch. Mr. Liddy was given instructions on its  
5 operation and use. In due course we returned it to the  
6 Central Intelligence.

7 Mr. Armstrong. Do you know what Mr. Liddy used that camera  
8 for?

9 Mr. Hunt. Of course.

10 Mr. Armstrong. What was that for, sir?

11 Mr. Hunt. For internal photography in the professional  
12 premises of Dr. Louis Fielding in Beverly Hills, California.

13 Mr. Armstrong. Was it ever used on any other occasions?

14 Mr. Hunt. No, not to my knowledge.

15 Mr. Armstrong. At what point was that returned to the

16 CIA?

17 Mr. Hunt. It was returned immediately upon our return  
18 from our initial reconnaissance. This camera was constructed  
19 in such a way that it was not used by CIA technicians; we had  
20 no way of knowing it was being used by anyone other than the  
21 entire object of the mission. The CIA never saw it  
22 again.

23 They took the film out of it, developed the film, and  
24 then printed it. I don't know if it was ever used again.  
25



People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

John Ehrlichman

June 8, 1973



1 impact or the effect on his ability to conduct foreign  
2 policy, of the dis -- of the disclosure, either public or  
3 to foreign governments, of some of these highly confidential  
4 facts and national security secrets.

5 Q Can you give us a date when you first found out  
6 that Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt were conducting an investigation  
7 into the Pentagon Papers leak?

8 A No, I can't. The way -- the way that it came  
9 up was that we were not able to improve the F.B.I. response  
10 to their requirements; and I believe it was Mr. Krogh  
11 informed me that it was his recommendation that we go forward  
12 with the use of these two men, to come to California and  
13 see if they could develop some facts which Krogh felt he  
14 badly needed, in defining the scope of the apparent  
15 conspiracy, and some of the missing details, as to how the  
16 Pentagon Papers had actually been obtained, duplicated, and  
17 disseminated.

18 Q I sense from your answer that he was then making  
19 a recommendation to you in that regard; is that correct?

20 A That is correct.

21 Q And did you approve that recommendation?

22 A I believe the recommendation was discussed  
23 specifically with the President, before it was approved.

24 Q By you?

25 A No. I -- as I say, I believe he -- he  
26 specifically approved it. And it's my recollection that he  
27 either discussed it with -- well, I know he discussed it  
28 with Mr. Hoover.



NOTE

Portions of the Grand Jury testimony of Egil Krogh have been separately distributed to Committee members.





NOTE

Portions of the Grand Jury testimony of David Young  
have been separately distributed to Committee members.





68. On August 26, 1971 Young sent a memorandum to Ehrlichman stating that the plan was to develop slowly a negative picture around the whole Pentagon study affair (preparation to publication) and to identify Ellsberg's associates and supporters on the new left with this negative image. The memorandum referred to material to be developed from the present Hunt/Liddy Project #1. The memo stated that it would be absolutely essential to have an overall game plan developed for its use in conjunction with a Congressional investigation. On the following day Ehrlichman sent a memorandum to Colson requesting a game plan for the use of materials obtained from Hunt/Liddy Special Project #1.

---

68.1 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2551.

68.2 Memorandum from David Young to John Ehrlichman,  
August 26, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 91, 6 SSC  
2646-50.

68.3 Memorandum from John Ehrlichman to Charles Colson,  
August 27, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 91, 6 SSC 2651.

68.4 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3675.

68.5 Charles Colson testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 648-49 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

---

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973  
Book 6



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Mr. DASH. Well, do you recall telling Mr. Young that Mr. Krogh was going to be taking the responsibility for that and that Mr. Young reminded you that maybe Mr. Hunt or some others made some copies of this memorandum? And that you indicated that, well, if that was so, the position to take would be that it would be a national security matter and you would button up?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. The conversation, basically, was for me to inquire of Mr. Young to get as much information as I could about what it was that Mr. Hunt was, in effect, threatening to say. And he went into this in considerable detail with me at that time—that is to say, the general subject matter.

Mr. DASH. Now, did you also indicate to him that the President knew about this and had fully authorized it or had felt that it was a perfectly legal matter at that time?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. If—I may have. I well may have, because in that period of time, 20, 21, 22 March, somewhere in there, I did have a conversation with the President about this.

Mr. DASH. By the way, did you also receive a memorandum suggesting that there would be a congressional investigation about the Ellsberg affair?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I have had a memorandum in my file from Mr. Colson on that subject. I do not know if that is the one to which you refer.

Mr. DASH. Did you ever receive one from Mr. Young?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. About a congressional investigation?

Mr. DASH. Yes, suggesting that Mr. Mardian and others might be involved in this.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I may have, but that goes way, way back in time. I have not seen anything like that.

Mr. DASH. Dated August 26, 1972.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. I well may have.

Mr. DASH. Do you recall having received this memorandum?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. It has my initial on it. I do not have a present recollection of the document.

Mr. DASH. Do you also note that there is an attached memorandum on the same date for Mr. Colson from you, Mr. Ehrlichman, subject, "Hunt/Liddy special project."

And I quote:

On the assumption that the proposed undertaking by Hunt and Liddy would be carried out and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you by next Wednesday a game plan on how and when you believe the materials should be used.

Do you recall that?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes, I have seen that recently on going back into the files.

Mr. DASH. Now, I just have one last question. There are others, Mr. Ehrlichman, that I would like to get into, but I have taken sufficient time and I will have a chance to question you later. But you also indicated this morning when I put the question to you whether you were concerned whether or not the so-called entry, whether you call it the Ellsberg break-in in this particular case, it was a break-in, the Ellsberg break-in, would become known publicly, whether that would be em-



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
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UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973  
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# IV

Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr.----- Ulasewicz: 2266, 2270-2276. LaRue: 2333-2338. Mardian: 2403-2410, 2419-2429, 2434, 2435. Strachan: 2481-2485, 2504-2506. Ehrlichman: 2625-2630.  
 Dash, Samuel, chief counsel and staff director.----- LaRue: 2277-2301. Strachan: 2445-2466. Ehrlichman: 2522-2554.  
 Thompson, Fred D., minority counsel----- LaRue: 2301-2306. Mardian: 2378-2382. Strachan: 2466-2475. Ehrlichman: 2554-2570.  
 Lenzner, Terry F., assistant chief counsel----- Ulasewicz: 2219-2238.  
 Hamilton, James, assistant chief counsel----- Mardian: 2345-2377, 2429-2433.  
 Shure, H. William, assistant minority counsel----- Ulasewicz: 2238-2245.

## EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Nos. 78 through 86—(2276) Photographs used during the interrogation of Mr. Ulasewicz----- 2228-2230  
 No. 87—(2328) Letter to Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Esq., from Archibald Cox, Special Prosecutor, dated June 12, 1973----- 2634  
 No. 88—(2344) Various letters between Robert W. Barker, Esq., Fred M. Vinson, Esq., Maurice H. Stans, and Fred C. LaRue re: Finance Committee To Re-Elect the President funds in possession of LaRue----- 2635  
 No. 89—(2367) Contents of a handwritten note furnished by Mr. Mardian after a telephone conversation with Mr. Stans on May 1, 1973----- 2642  
 No. 90—(2554) White House note for Young/Krogh from John Ehrlichman with attached memorandum from Bud Krogh and David Young. Subject: Pentagon Papers Project—Status Report as of August 11, 1971----- 2643  
 No. 91—(2554) Memorandum for John Ehrlichman from David R. Young. Subject: Status of Information Which Can Be Fed Into Congressional Investigation on Pentagon Papers Affair. Also memorandum for Charles Colson from John Ehrlichman. Subject: Hunt/Liddy Special Project No. 1----- 2646  
 No. 92—(2554) For identification only and not for publication.  
 No. 93—(2607) Affidavit of Henry E. Petersen----- 2652  
 No. 94—(2626) Letter to Egil Krogh from J. Edgar Hoover re: President Nixon's letter of July 29, 1971, regarding disclosures of top-secret material to the public----- 2655

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.

EXHIBIT No. 91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 26, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN EHRLICHMAN

FROM: DAVID R. YOUNG

SUBJECT: STATUS OF INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE  
FED INTO CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
ON PENTAGON PAPERS AFFAIR

Initial Situation

On July 20, 1971, after a meeting with Congressmen Hebert and Arends, Mardian, Macomber and Buzhardt reported that the Congressmen:

-- were willing to pursue the idea of an investigation;

-- would begin the investigation in a low key under a Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Beginning with the questions of security clearance, classification and declassification, they would then move into the more specific case of the Pentagon Study;

-- agreed that Mardian, Macomber and Buzhardt would set the format, supply the substantive data and develop the scenario.

At that time it was also believed that the principal person involved in the whole publication of the Pentagon Study was Ellsberg. On this basis it was estimated that it would take a little over 30 days to develop sufficient information for a Congressional investigation.

The plan then was to slowly develop a very negative picture around the whole Pentagon Study affair (preparation to publication) and then to identify Ellsberg's associates and supporters on the new left with this negative image. The end result would be to show (1) how they were

intent on undermining the policy of the government they were supposedly serving, and (2) how they have sought to put themselves above the law.

#### Present Situation

The above assumption that Ellsberg was the principal person responsible for the publication in the Times is no longer valid. In fact, it appears that those in Justice and Defense most familiar with this whole enterprise believe that substantial evidence is being developed for the criminal prosecution of individuals other than Ellsberg; namely, Gelb, Halperin, Warnke and Rand executives. Euzhardt states that only the FBI is disposed to thinking that Ellsberg is the sole prime mover.

In addition, the investigations have uncovered a proliferation of drafts involved in the 38, 43 and 47 volume sets and the number of copies of the sets has expanded far beyond what was initially estimated on the basis of distribution lists, etc.

It may well be that although Ellsberg is guilty of the crimes with which he is charged, he did not in fact turn the papers over to the New York Times. The Defense Department's analysis of the printed material may even show that Ellsberg did not have some of the papers which the New York Times printed.

Furthermore, the whole distribution network may be the work of still another and even larger network.

Examples of the types of problems which are presently being examined are as follows:

- (1) The likelihood that a good portion of the four volumes were prepared in final during the spring of 1969 while Gelb was still at Defense, and Halperin at the NSC.
- (2) The curious discovery that Bill Bundy received his 47-volume set two months before anyone else.

#### Status of Actions

Over 30 people (some a number of times) have been interviewed by Defense and Justice, and this week investigative teams have been



dispatched to Europe and Vietnam.

- Buzhardt will be interviewing Clark Clifford this Friday.

- Buzhardt will interview William Kaufman shortly and this could be quite helpful in that Kaufman was one of the few people that apparently quit the project after protesting to Gelb that it was biased. Buzhardt has reason to believe that Kaufman will name names and identify those who were using the Study as a brief.

- An interview with McNamara will be conducted by Buzhardt as soon as McNamara returns from vacation in early September.

- An all-out adversary interrogation of Halperin, Gelb, Warnke, Rand executives and any other prime targets developed by that time is to be undertaken by Buzhardt's team shortly.

#### Comment

My own impression of Buzhardt (and most of the above is based on his investigations, since Mardian's boys are concentrating on Ellisberg) is that, although he is not moving as fast as we'd like, he should get us what we want. He believes that within 14 days, when he has been able to reach some reasonably certain preliminary conclusions, we will have a good basis for setting a Congressional strategy. He is convinced that at least Gelb and the Rand executives are lying in a very grave manner, and if he can prove this I think we'll have a good idea of where we want to go and how to get there.

#### Recommendation

That we give Defense and Justice a little more time to develop their cases and that we set up a strategy meeting for September 9, 1971, to determine an overall game plan.

Issues to be addressed would include the following:

- (1) If there is enough to bring criminal actions against Gelb, the Rand executives, etc., do we want to prosecute or do we want

to bring such material out through the Congressional investigation?

(2) If criminal prosecution is decided against for all except Ellsberg, when would it be most desirable to undertake the Congressional investigation?

(3) What strategy should be followed in the actual committee investigation (a) if only Ellsberg is to be prosecuted, or (b) if all the key persons are to be prosecuted?

(4) Do we want the Congressional investigation to also get into the substance of the Pentagon Study? If so, a game plan must be devised for determining what, when and how information should be fed to the committee.

(5) If the decision is made to move ahead in these substantive areas, careful consideration should be given to the effect of the credibility fallout on us. For this reason it might be best to stick with specific blunders such as the 1963 coup, the miscalculation on the need of forces, etc.

[NOTE: I am sending you a separate Hunt to Colson memorandum which attempts to select the politically damaging material involving the Democratic hierarchy. I personally believe a good deal more material could be developed along these lines. To begin with, we have Concin, Lansdale, Harkins and Nolting who could possibly be called upon to testify.]

(6) To what extent should we try to show the lack of objectivity and the intent of the participants in the Pentagon Study to distort and mislead. (Note that exploitation of this theme undercuts points (4) and (5).)

(7) Effect of South Vietnamese election on timing of investigation.

(8) Effect of Ellsberg trial which will now not come up before March of 1972 on timing of investigation.

(9) How quickly do we want to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image? \*

Action

That you schedule a strategy meeting on September 9th with Macomber, Mardian, Buzhardt, Krogh and Young. (I have discussed this approach with Bud and he is in agreement).

Approve

E

Disapprove

Other

\*In connection with issue (9), it is important to point out that with the recent article on Ellsberg's lawyer, Boudin, we have already started on a negative press image for Ellsberg. If the present Hunt/Liddy Project #1 is successful, it will be absolutely essential to have an overall game plan developed for its use in conjunction with the Congressional investigation. In this connection, I believe that the point of Buchanan's memorandum on attacking Ellsberg through the press should be borne in mind; namely, that the situation being attacked is too big to be undermined by planted leaks among the friendly press.

If there is to be any damaging of Ellsberg's image and those associated with him, it will therefore be necessary to fold in the press planting with the Congressional investigation. I mentioned these points to Colson earlier this week, and his reply was that we should just leave it to him and he would take care of getting the information out. I believe, however, that in order to orchestrate this whole operation we have to be aware of precisely what Colson wants to do.

Recommendation: That you sign the memorandum to Colson asking him to draw up a game plan (Tab A).

*Tab A as sent 5/21*





PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
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2570.  
Lenzner, Terry F., assistant chief counsel----- Ulasewicz: 2219-2238.  
Hamilton, James, assistant chief counsel----- Mardian: 2345-2377, 2429-2433.  
Shure, H. William, assistant minority counsel----- Ulasewicz: 2238-2245.

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Nos. 78 through 86—(2276) Photographs used during the interrogation of  
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No. 87—(2328) Letter to Fred M. Vinson, Jr., Esq., from Archibald Cox,  
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No. 91—(2554) Memorandum for John Ehrlichman from David R. Young.  
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Note: Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.

2651

August 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR      CHARLES COLSON  
FROM                      JOHN EHRLICHMAN  
SUBJECT                  HUNT/LIDDY SPECIAL PROJECT #1

On the assumption that the proposed undertaking by Hunt and Liddy would be carried out and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you by next Wednesday a game plan as to how and when you believe the materials should be used.

A TRUE COPY





PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

---

HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

. Phase I: Watergate Investigation

WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973

Book 9



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Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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96-296 O

WASHINGTON : 1973

psychological assessment on Dr. Ellsberg. I believe that the CIA, the FBI, and perhaps the Counter-Intelligence Corps were requested to provide the Plumbers group with their full holdings on Ellsberg. And in due course, we did enter the office of Dr. Fielding, who had been Dr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist, to determine if there were any psychiatric notes.

Mr. DASH. Now, Mr. Chairman, this particular memorandum, July 28, 1971, from Mr. Hunt to Mr. Colson, the subject, "Neutralization of Ellsberg," I would like to have identified for the record and admitted in evidence.

Senator ERVIN. It will be appropriately marked as an exhibit and received in evidence as such.

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 150.\*]

Mr. DASH. Now, I think you testified in your statement, you have indicated that you did indeed engage in a break-in. Was it subsequently determined that an attempt should be made to obtain Dr. Ellsberg's medical files from the psychiatrist's office?

Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DASH. You have a memorandum which the committee provided you, dated August 27, 1971, from Mr. Ehrlichman to Charles Colson, with the subject "Hunt-Liddy Special Project No. 1"?

Mr. HUNT. I have such a memorandum.

Mr. DASH. That is dated August 27. I think this was previously put in the record by the committee, attached during Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony. I have just been informed that it is exhibit No. 91 in the committee record.

Do you have a copy of that memorandum?

Mr. HUNT. I beg your pardon.

Mr. DASH. Do you have a copy of that memorandum?

Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. DASH. Let me just read the memorandum; it is brief. This is from Mr. Ehrlichman to Mr. Colson:

On the assumption that the proposed undertaking by Hunt and Liddy would be carried out and would be successful, I would appreciate receiving from you by next Wednesday a game plan as to how and when you believe the materials should be used.

This is referring to Hunt-Liddy special project No. 1.

Mr. Hunt, what, from your understanding, on the date of August 27, 1971, would Hunt and Liddy's special project No. 1 be?

Mr. HUNT. I would assume it to be the Fielding entry, based on the fact that Mr. Liddy and I, as of that date, would just have returned from our initial reconnaissance of Dr. Fielding's professional premises in Beverly Hills, we would have submitted a feasibility study.

Mr. DASH. And that the reference there for Hunt and Liddy special project No. 1 would refer to the proposed covert entry of Dr. Fielding's office for the psychiatric file?

Mr. HUNT. Yes.

Mr. DASH. Now, in fact, you and Mr. Liddy did go to Los Angeles to determine whether a covert entry was feasible and you did determine that it was; did you not?

Mr. HUNT. Yes.

\*See p. 3886.







People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

Charles Colson

June 8, 1973

1           The text of the memorandum was something to the  
2 effect of:

3           "Consistent with the request that we get  
4 out some information on Mr. Ellsberg, would you  
5 disseminate --" or, no. "Would you try to get out  
6 the attached memorandum which I have received from  
7 Howard Hunt?"

8           And it was an article that Hunt had prepared  
9 actually, about Mr. Ellsberg and his relationship to Mr.  
10 Beaudine.

11           And that, through one of my staff, I had  
12 delivered to a reporter who was doing some writing in that  
13 area at the time.

14           I received a second memorandum from Mr. Ehrlichman  
15 on August -- dated August 27th, although I don't think I  
16 received it until after the 31st; and it was a memorandum  
17 which had a caption on it. And I have -- it was unlike  
18 any other memorandum I had received from Mr. Ehrlichman.

19           The caption was entitled: "Hunt-Liddy Special  
20 Operation Number 1." And it was to the effect of -- I've  
21 forgotten the precise tenor of the memorandum, but it was:  
22 Assuming the information that Mr. Liddy and Mr. Hunt were  
23 working on is obtained, will you give me a -- your  
24 recommendations as to how it can best be distributed?

25           The memo was not -- I had never heard of the  
26 Hunt-Liddy Special Operation Number 1. It was a term that  
27 I had never seen nor heard.

28           I think Mr. Ehrlichman was out of town that

1 week. I recall writing on the top of the memorandum "See  
2 J.D.E." In other words, something that I would take up  
3 and discuss with him.

4 I put it in a folder of items that I maintained,  
5 to talk about -- put it in a folder that I kept for things  
6 that I would take up with Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman.

7 As I say, either the week after Labor Day or  
8 the second week in September, I met with Mr. Ehrlichman  
9 and asked him about the memorandum. He told me at that  
10 time that there had been a -- I asked him what it was that  
11 he wanted gotten out; what kind of information it was; what  
12 this was all about.

13 And he said that there was an attempt -- there  
14 had been an attempt to get at Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatric  
15 records; that it had failed -- or that it had not been  
16 successful, or that -- that they hadn't gotten them, I think  
17 is the phrase he used; and that I should not -- that I should  
18 forget about it.

19 He also told me that it was a matter that was  
20 classified, and that I should not discuss it.





69. On August 27, 1971 CIA Deputy Director Cushman telephoned Ehrlichman to request that Hunt be restrained in his requests to the CIA for further assistance. Hunt had requested from the CIA such items as a stenographer, credit cards, and an office in New York with a phone listed in New York that could be monitored in Washington. Ehrlichman agreed that the CIA need not meet Hunt's additional requests.

---

69.1 Robert Cushman testimony, 8 SSC 3293-94.

69.2 Memorandum for the record, August 30, 1971 and routing slip, August 31, 1971, SSC Exhibit No. 122, 8 SSC 3377-79.

69.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, Executive Session, May 30, 1973, 239 (received from Senate Appropriations Committee).

69.4 CIA employee affidavit, May 18, 1973 (received from CIA).



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Phase I: Watergate Investigation

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 31, AUGUST 1, AND 2, 1973

Book 8



Printed for the use of the  
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WASHINGTON : 1973

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Mr. HAMILTON. Did Mr. Hunt make any request to you as to how these items should be delivered?

General CUSHMAN. He said that he did not want to come back into the Agency and could they be delivered to him at a house, safe house, as it is called, somewhere off the premises of the CIA.

Mr. HAMILTON. And did you agree to this?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, I did.

Mr. HAMILTON. And did you subsequently report your actions to Mr. Helms who was then the Director of the CIA?

General CUSHMAN. I discussed it with him to the best of my recollection a couple of days later. As I recall, on July 7 I was the Acting Director. Mr. Helms was not present. And therefore on the 8th is when I announced at the staff meeting about the phone call. Then after Mr. Hunt did appear on July 22, it is the best of my recollection that I did so report to the Director, probably along with a lot of other things that we talked about frequently, and whether he remembers this I don't know. The last time I talked to him he said he didn't recall as to whether I had talked to him or not. I think I did.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your recollection, General, that he indicated his approval of the actions you had taken?

General CUSHMAN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did there come a time around August 18, 1971, when Mr. Hunt began to make additional demands on the Agency?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. On July 18, 1971, he conveyed to me, not directly—I never did talk directly with Mr. Hunt after the interview as far as I recall—but he relayed through my executive assistant that he wanted the services of a stenographer whom he knew and we turned that down. I discussed it with Mr. Helms. We both agreed it was not a proper request.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was it reported to you that these new requests that Mr. Hunt was making was in conjunction with what he described as a new assignment that he had been given by the White House?

General CUSHMAN. I can't recall that exactly. I thought so. But I am not sure. I do know that I thought at the time that since he was a paid consultant, that he should be hiring a stenographer if he needed one and that he was probably trying to lighten the expenses of his job, so to speak, by borrowing whatever he could from us. And that was something that we could not do.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you outline for the committee the other requests that Mr. Hunt made of the agency besides the requests for a secretary?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. And would you also indicate while doing this, General Cushman, which requests the Agency granted and which ones were turned down?

General CUSHMAN. Yes. As I say, I regarded the secretary thing as something entirely separate, that he was trying to save the expenses of hiring a stenographer. And that request did get relayed to me promptly along about August 18. However, the other requests I didn't really find out about until they were cumulative and the technical services people began to worry about these requests and they called my office to see whether the instructions still stood to help Hunt out.

I found that he had been given a tape recorder and that he had



been issued a camera. I found out that the camera had been used to expose some film and that we had developed it and delivered the prints, I think it was, to him. I found out that he had brought in another man whom I find out in 1973 was probably Liddy. He had brought in another man and talked the technical services people into giving that man an alias and some false papers. So all in all it struck me that he was exceeding what he had told me he was going to do; namely, a one-time interview, and that he was going to do this himself. So we discussed it, Mr. Helms and I, and decided to turn it off.

Mr. HAMILTON. Just for the record, the recorder was contained in a typewriter case, that is correct?

General CUSHMAN. I believe so. I never have seen any of the equipment. Until this year I never really saw a list of what had been issued.

Mr. HAMILTON. And the camera was the type of camera that could be disguised in a tobacco pouch.

General CUSHMAN. That is what I understand.

Mr. HAMILTON. General, do you know what any of the equipment that Mr. Hunt obtained was used for?

General CUSHMAN. I think he kept it. I believe the technical services people asked for its return, but it was not returned, with the exception, I have been told, of the camera, I believe it was, as being not suited to whatever it was he wanted to use it for.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you know what it was actually used for?

General CUSHMAN. No, I have no idea.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did Mr. Hunt also request that he be given a New York address and phone services in New York?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. And this was when we decided that these requests were clearly escalating into improper requests, in that they would involve CIA people. He wanted an office, and he wanted the telephone to be monitored, as an answering service would, when he was not there, and this, so to speak, was just too much, and I called up Mr. Ehrlichman and told him we could not accede to these types of requests. That I thought he was, he, Mr. Hunt, was not exercising proper judgment, and that, therefore, I passed the word on.

Mr. HAMILTON. What was Mr. Ehrlichman's comment at that time?

General CUSHMAN. He said "OK," which I took to mean that we did not have to accede to Hunt's request, and said that he would restrain Mr. Hunt.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was this action taken on your own part or at the instruction of Mr. Helms?

General CUSHMAN. We talked it over, and I made the phone call. It was on his instructions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, that date on which you called Mr. Ehrlichman, which I believe you said was August 27, 1971. Is that correct?

General CUSHMAN. August 27, 1971.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did Mr. Hunt make another request of the Agency?

General CUSHMAN. I do not have any knowledge of it firsthand. I have been told that he asked for a credit card and that this was turned down.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your information that he asked for that credit card on August 31?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, that is what I understand.



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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Phase I: Watergate Investigation

WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 31, AUGUST 1, AND 2, 1973

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NOTE.—Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.



3377

EXHIBIT NO. 122

HUNT, HOWARD

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASS		ACTION TO BE TAKEN	
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDCI	31 AUG 71	JK
2			
3	DDCI		WJ
4			
5	ER-FILE		
6	Howard Hunt		
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p>I called John P. Wickham Friday and explained why we could not meet these requests. I indicated Hunt was becoming a pain in the neck. John said he would retain Hunt.</p> <p>Good JK B</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
DDCI			31 AUG 71
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions

(10)

30 August 1971

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Additional Request from Mr. Howard Hunt  
for Agency Support

1. Mr. Deputy Chief, TSD telephoned on 27 August 1971 to report additional requests from Mr. Howard Hunt. He said that Mr. Hunt had telephoned Mr. his regular TSD contact, on 26 August 1971 and asked him to meet a courier at the airport to receive exposed film and arrange for its development. Mr. Hunt also arranged to pick up the developed film later. Mr. said that the pseudonym of Mr. Hunt's colleague, whose identity remains unknown to us, is

2. Mr. said that he was increasingly concerned at the nature of assistance requested by Mr. Hunt. TSD had initially furnished Mr. Hunt with notinal pocket-litter documentation. Hunt was now pressing for fully backstopped documentation and support. A driver's license and credit cards (including Hertz and Avis) had been requested in pseudonym. Mr. said that he had turned down this request. Hunt had also asked that the Agency arrange to backstop a New York phone number either through an answering service there or by a hookup which would permit the New York number to be answered in Washington. Hunt also wanted the Agency to arrange for a New York business office to acknowledge him. Mr. said this service was beyond TSD's capability and would have to be handled by the Office of Security.

3. I told Mr.                    that Mr. Hunt's latest requests drew us even further into the sensitive area of domestic operations against Americans and that all such requests should be referred to General Cushman's office. Meanwhile these requests should not be met.





Retyped from indistinct original

E X E C U T I V E   S E S S I O N

— — —  
PURPORTED ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG INCIDENTS

— — —  
WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973

— — —  
United States Senate,

Subcommittee of the Committee  
on Appropriations,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to call, in  
room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L.  
McClellan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young and Hruska.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Ehrlichman, we welcome you here this morning. We  
appreciate your response to our invitation to appear before  
the committee. I note you have counsel with you. In this  
particular inquiry in these executive sessions we have been  
having we have permitted counsel to be present. They can  
only, of course, advise you regarding your legal rights and  
so forth. Other than that, they are not permitted to ask  
questions or interrupt the proceedings in any way.

We have heretofore and in view of the delicacy of the  
inquiry that the committee is making and its importance we

retyped from indistinct original

Chairman McClellan. The pilfering of those papers was during the Nixon Administration?

Mr. Ehrlichman. Yes, sir. The documents themselves were assembled, collected and analyzed and so on.

How did Hunt secure CIA aid?

I received a phone call from General Robert Cushman, Deputy Director of the CIA, in late August 1971 -- he says it was August 27. I can't disagree with that -- saying that Hunt was receiving aid from the Agency which was becoming potentially awkward.

I asked him whether Hunt was acting for the Agency or the White House. He said the White House. I asked him what Hunt's assignment was from the White House. He said he did not know.

In response to his request I told the General I would take responsibility for the agency terminating its assistance to Hunt and if there were any squawks or kickbacks from anyone in the White House, to simply refer them to me.

In 1969 -- this would have been two years previous when we first came in office --

Senator Pastore. Before you leave that point, the testimony of General Cushman before this Committee is that you called General Cushman advising that Howard Hunt had been added to the Security Office of the White House.

Now you just testified that the first time you came

SECRET

ORIGINAL

17

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PURPOSED AMENDS TO REVISE THE CRIMINAL ESPIONAGE ACTS  
IN THE WATERGATE AND SIMILAR INCIDENTS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 30, 1973

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING  
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS.  
TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANS-  
MISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER  
TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

United States Senate,

Subcommittee of the Committee  
on Appropriations,

Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to call, in  
room 1223, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John L.  
McClellan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Pastore, Young and Muskie.

Chairman McClellan. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Ehrlichman, we welcome you here this morning. We  
appreciate your response to our invitation to appear before  
the committee. I note you have counsel with you. In this  
particular inquiry in these executive sessions we have been  
having we have permitted counsel to be present. They can  
only, of course, advise you regarding your legal rights and  
so forth. Other than that, they are not permitted to ask  
questions or influence the proceedings in any way.

We have therefore and in view of the delicacy of the  
inquiry and the committee is asking, and its importance to

[8674]

SECRET  
SECRET

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Now you just testified that the first time [8675] came





# IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY DV

Vol 9-CIA

DOCUMENTATION PROVIDED BY CIA

1 June 1973

VOLUME I

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF VIRGINIA     )  
                                  ) ss.  
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX    )

I, 13           being first duly sworn, state:

1. I was born on                   in                   . After  
serving as an Army officer in World War II and completing my college  
education, I joined the Central Intelligence Agency in October     . I have  
held the position of  
                                  since November

2. On 22 July 1971 Mr. E. Howard Hunt, a former Agency employee  
who had joined the White House staff, called on the Deputy Director of  
Central Intelligence, General Cushman. I was present in the room because  
General Cushman usually asked me to sit in on his meetings. When Mr.  
Hunt arrived he said that he wanted to talk to General Cushman privately  
and I withdrew.

3. Later that day General Cushman told me that Mr. Hunt had asked  
for some help (of an unspecified nature), that he (General Cushman) had  
checked it out and that it was all right, and that he had told Mr. Hunt to get  
in touch with me to obtain the assistance. Mr. Hunt called me later in the  
day and requested aid in obtaining a physical disguise and "pocket litter"  
documentation in alias to assist him in connection with an extremely sensi-  
tive project, which he could not further discuss, and which had been approved  
by Mr. Ehrlichman. Under these circumstances my presumption was that  
the request must be legitimate and proper.



3V

4. I then contacted Mr. // Acting Chief of Technical Services Division, and instructed him to make arrangements for furnishing a physical disguise and alias documentation to an individual (Mr. Hunt), who had insisted that his identity not be known to the TSD officers. I explained to Mr. // that the undertaking was for an extremely sensitive project which had been requested by the White House, of which I was not at liberty to describe further and the nature of which I was unaware. I also indicated that because of the sensitivity factor all the requested support should be handled by TSD.

5. When Mr. // explained that it would be necessary for a TSD officer to meet the subject before creating a disguise, and because Mr. Hunt was unwilling to come to the Headquarters building again, I arranged for the TSD officer to meet Mr. Hunt, who was under an assumed name, in an Agency safehouse. I obtained a key to the safehouse from the Office of Logistics on 23 July and passed it to a TSD representative, Mr. 10 I believe. TSD was able to provide Mr. Hunt (who dealt with them under the alias of "Mr. Edward") with a disguise and alias documentation later that day (23 July 1971). 101077

6. Following my contacts with TSD officers I notified the Executive Assistant to the DDP, Mr. 16 that on the instruction of General Cushman I had enlisted the assistance of TSD (which was subordinate to the Directorate for Plans) in a project for the White House which was said to be extremely sensitive and whose nature was unknown to me.

7. My next contact with Mr. Hunt was a telephone call from him on 18 August 1971 to a request that the Agency furnish a specific secretary (who was named) for a temporary assignment of between 30 and 90 days. Mr. Hunt said that he needed the secretary to work on a highly sensitive assignment and that Mr. John Ehrlichman had suggested that he call General



Cushman. Mr. Hunt said that he did not want the young lady's Division Chief to know that he or the White House was involved in the request. Mr. Hunt suggested that the Director's office should immediately recall the young lady from her assignment overseas and explain to all concerned that she was urgently needed for an unspecified special assignment. Mr. Hunt again stressed that White House involvement should not be mentioned. After discussing the case with General Cushman and the Office of Personnel I informed Mr. Hunt that the Agency would be unwilling to withdraw the secretary from her overseas assignment. I suggested that if Mr. Hunt would furnish us with a statement of his requirements we might be able to provide a qualified secretary from Headquarters. Mr. Hunt replied that the individual he had requested was the only secretary he would accept because of the "loyalty factor." Mr. Hunt said that he would discuss our attitude with Mr. Ehrlichman and I heard no more of this particular matter.

8. Mr. [redacted] records show that we were again in contact by telephone on 20 August 1971 regarding a new request from Mr. Hunt for a tape recorder and business cards in alias. Since there was nothing improper in this request and it was consistent with my understanding of the assistance we were authorized to give Mr. Hunt, I instructed Mr. [redacted] to proceed with this assistance.

9. My records show that Mr. [redacted] called me on 26 August 1971 to express concern about additional assistance that had been requested by Mr. Hunt. I learned that Mr. Hunt had introduced an unidentified associate who had been given a disguise and identification documents in alias. Mr. Hunt had also on about 25 August requested and received training in clandestine photography and was given a camera concealed in a tobacco pouch in connection with a new assignment. Mr. [redacted] expressed concern that Mr. Hunt now possessed a considerable amount of special materials and

noted that the concealed camera was a particularly sensitive item. I agreed with Mr. [ ] concern and remarked to Mr. [ ] that it raised the question of the use of Agency materials in domestic clandestine activity. I told Mr. [ ] that I would report his call promptly and obtain guidance, and that additional gear should not be given to Mr. Hunt and his requests referred to the Deputy Director's office. (It should also be noted that General Cushman's office was informed only after the camera had been given to Mr. Hunt and his associate outfitted with a disguise.)

10. I summarized my conversation with Mr. [ ] in a memorandum for General Cushman and gave it to him the next morning (27 August). My covering buckslip stated that Mr. Hunt's latest request raised two significant problems for the Agency. Mr. Hunt had introduced a stranger into the picture without any word of explanation to General Cushman from the White House. I noted that this unknown person was now aware of Agency support to Hunt in whatever he was doing. I also noted that Mr. Hunt's possession and use of unique clandestine equipment (the disguised camera) in domestic activity of uncertain nature also contained potential for trouble. My buckslip read: "The Agency could suffer if its clandestine gear were discovered (being) used in domestic secret operations." My buckslip continued that I would instruct TSD to clear all of Hunt's requests with the Deputy Director's office and recommended that General Cushman seek Mr. Ehrlichman's assurance that Mr. Hunt's "latest caper" was legitimate. (We were still operating on the assumption that the White House project was proper but feared that Mr. Hunt had exceeded his authority.) My buckslip concluded that "Even then (if Mr. Ehrlichman validated Mr. Hunt's request) this does not relieve the Agency from its vulnerability if associated with domestic clandestine operations against Americans."

11. I had given my memorandum to General Cushman on the morning of 27 August 1971 when Mr. [ ] called me again to report additional troublesome requests from Mr. Hunt on the previous day. Mr. [ ] said that he was increasingly concerned at the nature of assistance requested by Mr. Hunt. The latter was now pressing for fully backstopped documentation and support, including a driver's license and car rental credit cards in alias. Mr. [ ] said that he had turned down this request. Mr. Hunt also asked that the Agency arrange to backstop a New York telephone number either through an answering service there or by a hookup which would permit the New York number to be answered in Washington. Mr. [ ] said that this action was beyond his Division's capability. I told Mr. [ ] that Mr. Hunt's latest requests drew the Agency even further into the sensitive area of domestic clandestine operations against Americans and that all such requests should be referred to General Cushman's office. I added that, meanwhile, Mr. Hunt's requests should not be met. I reported Mr. [ ] call promptly to General Cushman and recommended that the Agency terminate its support to Mr. Hunt because he was drawing us into a compromising and dangerous situation in which we were not authorized to be engaged, i. e., facilitating domestic clandestine operations against Americans.

12. General Cushman's notes on my buckslips indicate that he promptly spoke to Mr. Ehrlichman by telephone at 1100 hours on 27 August 1971, and explained why CIA could not meet Mr. Hunt's requests. General Cushman noted on the buckslip that Mr. Ehrlichman indicated he would call a halt to Mr. Hunt's activities.

13. I informed Mr. [ ] on 27 August that General Cushman had notified Mr. Ehrlichman that CIA could not give additional help to

Mr. Hunt, that TSD should not accept any more requests from Mr. Hunt, and that Mr. Hunt should be instructed to return the sensitive materials from TSD. TSD records show that when Mr. Hunt next contacted TSD personnel on 31 August 1971 he was again informed that the Agency could not provide further assistance.

14. The 27th of August was a Friday. On Monday, 30 August, I wrote a memorandum reporting on my 27 August conversation with Mr. 11 and my instruction not to meet Mr. Hunt's new request. General Cushman sent the memorandum to Director Helms and wrote on the covering buckslip that he told Mr. Ehrlichman on 27 August that the Agency could not accept Mr. Hunt's requests for clandestine equipment or operational support. Director Helms initialed the buckslip with the comment "Good."

15. With the closing off of Agency contacts with Mr. Hunt I discarded my handwritten notes covering my talks with Mr. Hunt and Mr. 11. I filed my memoranda to General Cushman, however. In June 1972, when Mr. Howard Hunt's name turned up in connection with the Watergate affair, I retrieved these memoranda and went to see Director Helms to remind him of the contacts with Mr. Hunt a year earlier. I left these memoranda with Mr. Helms.

16. Shortly thereafter the CIA Director of Security, Mr. 4 informed me that a representative of the FBI wanted to talk to me because my name had been found in a telephone list in Mr. Howard Hunt's office. I informed Director Helms of this fact and he said that he would take up the matter with the Department of Justice. He said that if an




FBI officer contacted me directly I should say that since my contacts with Mr. Hunt had been in an official capacity, all inquiries should be referred to Director Helms. I heard nothing more from the FBI.

13

Affiant:

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before  
me this 11th day of Nov, 1973.



A Notary Public in and for the County of Fairfax, Virginia.

My Commission Expires: My Commission Expires September 22, 1976



70. Krogh and Young have testified that they telephoned Ehrlichman at Cape Cod on or about August 30, 1971 and reported that Hunt and Liddy had returned from California and reported that a covert operation could be undertaken and would not be traceable. Ehrlichman gave his approval. Ehrlichman has testified that he does not recall receiving this telephone call.

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- 70.1 Egil Krogh testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 47-48.
- 70.2 David Young testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, August 22, 1973, 57-59.
- 70.3 John Ehrlichman testimony, 6 SSC 2548.
- 70.4 John Ehrlichman log, August 29-September 5, 1971 (received from SSC).





NOTE

Portions of the Grand Jury testimony of Egil Krogh have been separately distributed to Committee members.



NOTE

Portions of the Grand Jury testimony of David Young  
have been separately distributed to Committee members.







PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES  
Phase I: Watergate Investigation  
WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, AND 25, 1973  
Book 6



Printed for the use of the  
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

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WASHINGTON : 1973

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Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, I don't know that or whether they would be in a medical record center or in a clinic or where, and in point of fact, as you know, Mr. Dash—

Mr. DASH. I think the memo is pretty clear.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Excuse me. In point of fact when they went in there, they didn't find it.

Mr. DASH. Yes, but read the memo again, Mr. Ehrlichman. The memo says, "Examine all the medical files still held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst covering the 2-year period."

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes.

Mr. DASH. I think a clear reading of that is that they are in his possession.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Again I don't mean to quibble with you. The words here are not my words. They are the words of the writers of the memo. The thing that was imparted to me by the word "covert" was that these people would not identify themselves as investigators of the White House or anything of this kind, and that their identities would not be known to the people that they were interrogating.

Mr. DASH. All right. So they would not identify themselves as representatives of the White House but through some identification they might get access to the building.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Not necessarily. They might have gotten access through another doctor, through a nurse. There are all kinds of ways that one could get this information.

Mr. DASH. But it would include getting access to the building, would it not?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Not inevitably.

Mr. DASH. I didn't say inevitably, it would include it.

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. As one of a number of possibilities.

Mr. DASH. And also, say, by some covert activity, but not identify themselves as members of the White House staff, of getting access to the office.

Would it not include that as one of the alternatives that they could take?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Well, you are asking me to define phrases in somebody else's memo.

Mr. DASH. Well, you approved this memo. You didn't put any other conditions on it, did you?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No, I am trying to tell you what I thought I was approving.

Mr. DASH. Well, those who read it undertook to also interpret what you thought you were approving. By the way, did Mr. Young and Mr. Krogh call you while you were in Cape Cod after Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy came back, and tell you that they had established that it was feasible that they could get access, and that you said, "OK.. go ahead and let them do it."

Do you recall that call that Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young made to you in Cape Cod?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. No. I don't—as a matter of fact, I don't recall any business calls while I was up there at all.

Mr. DASH. Would you be surprised if I told you that Mr. Young would so testify?

Mr. EHRLICHMAN. Yes, I would.





Sunday, August 29 - Sunday, September 5

Cape Cod

Tuesday, September 7

8:00 HRH office  
8:15 Roosevelt Room  
8:30 CIEP - Cabinet Room  
11:00 Wrede Petersmeyer  
2:00 Ken Cole  
2:30 Senator Baker, Jim Jordan (Baker's AA), Ruckelshaus,  
Train, Whitaker, Don Crabill  
3:40 Sec. Connally, George Shultz  
5:40 HRH

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8

8:00 HRH office  
8:15 Roosevelt Room  
10:00 Bob Patricelli (to say goodbye)  
10:45 Bud Krogh, David Young  
11:25 Dr. Sidney Marland  
12:15 Don Rice  
12:45 Lunch in Mess with Sec. Richardson, Dick Nathan  
2:00 Governor Dan Evans, Mrs. Evans, two sons  
3:00 Ed Morgan  
3:30 President  
6:00 Dinner reservations at Le Grande Scene (Kennedy Center)  
7:30 Kennedy Center "Mass" - BLACK TIE  
Reception following performance in North Lounge

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1971

8:00 HRH office  
8:15 Roosevelt Room  
9:30 Ken Cole  
9:45 Ken Cole, Chuck Colson  
10:00 Bill Magruder  
11:00 Fred Buzhardt, Bob Mardian, Krogh, Young  
12:10 Motorcade departs South Driveway - JDF in Staff Car #1  
12:30 Presidential address to Joint Session  
1:15 Lunch in Mess with Governor Evans, Dwight Chapin  
3:00 Secretary Morton  
6:00 Kennedy Center - National Symphony - BLACK TIE





71. Prior to September 2, 1971 either Krogh (according to Krogh) or Ehrlichman (according to Colson) requested Colson to obtain \$5,000. The money was to be used to finance the Fielding operation. Colson requested Joseph Baroody, a Washington public relations consultant, to deliver \$5,000 to Krogh who turned it over to Liddy. Several weeks later Colson caused Baroody to be repaid with \$5,000 from a political contribution by a dairy industry political organization.

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71.1 Charles Colson testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 651-56 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury)..

71.2 John Ehrlichman testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 8, 1973, 552-53 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).

71.3 Egil Krogh testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, January 30, 1974, 32-35.

71.4 David Young testimony, District of Columbia Grand Jury, August 22, 1973, 77-80.

71.5 E. Howard Hunt testimony, 9 SSC 3774.

71.6 Joseph Baroody affidavit, January 30, 1974 (received from SSC).

71.7 George Webster deposition, Common Cause v. Finance Committee to Re-elect the President, December 24, 1973, 33-35.

71.8 Marion Harrison testimony, SSC Executive Session, December 4, 1973, 43-45 (received from SSC).



People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

Charles Colson

June 8, 1973



1 corridor or talked to someone at the White House mess, the  
2 lunch room.

3 But I don't have any record of having had any  
4 meetings during that period.

5 Q Did you participate in an interview on or about  
6 May 8th, 1973, with two special agents from the Federal  
7 Bureau of Investigation?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And during the course of that conversation, did  
10 you tell them in substance that you had no discussions or  
11 advance information of the alleged burglary -- that must be  
12 referring to Dr. Fielding's office -- but that you knew that  
13 the Plumbers were going to the West Coast but did not know  
14 which of them would actually make the trip?

15 A I don't recall putting it specifically that way.  
16 The substance of that is correct, that I knew that they  
17 were conducting investigations.

18 As to when I knew that, I just don't know. I  
19 don't recall saying "I don't know which one."

20 Q Had you been asked for funds at or about this  
21 time by anyone associated with the Plumbers group?

22 A Well, my best recollection is I told the FBI,  
23 in that same interview, that I had a phone conversation.  
24 I cannot be precise as to when it was.

25 Q With whom was it, sir?

26 A My recollection is it was with Mr. Ehrlichman.

27 Q Will you tell us, please, the substance of that  
28 conversation?

1           A     Yes. Mr. Ehrlichman asked me if I could  
2 obtain five thousand dollars for Mr. Krogh. And he indicated  
3 that the money was needed rather quickly, as I recall.  
4 And I obtained it from Mr. Joseph Baroody, who was at that  
5 time the -- that was a partner in the Public Relations firm  
6 that was organizing the committee for new prosperity,  
7 which was the group that was the outside support, public  
8 support or private -- a private group on the outside that  
9 was -- that had been formed to generate public support for  
10 the President's new economic policy.

11           I did not, during the course of that first  
12 interview, know that it was even Mr. Baroody that I had  
13 asked for the funds. I had to go back and check and discover  
14 that it was.

15           Q     Do I understand you to tell me that the --  
16 that Mr. Ehrlichman asked you to obtain five thousand dollars  
17 for Mr. Krogh?

18           A     Yes.

19           Q     When did he make this request from you?

20           A     The only way I can tell is going back now, of  
21 course, and the benefit of piecing together the dates and  
22 the times and the places of what I now know, and looking  
23 at the records.

24           I would have to assume that it was the week  
25 before Labor Day. I can't, however, be more precise than  
26 that. It could have been after Labor Day.

27           Q     Where were you when you received this telephone  
28 call from Mr. Ehrlichman?

1 A I was in my office.

2 Q In the White House?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Do you have any idea where Mr. Ehrlichman was  
5 when he made that request to you?

6 A No; but one reason that I think it was the  
7 week before Labor Day is that I think Mr. Ehrlichman was  
8 on the West Coast. But that's -- I haven't checked that.  
9 I know it was a phone conversation.

10 Q Was that a highly unusual request for you to  
11 receive from Mr. Ehrlichman?

12 A Not really. One of my assignments in the  
13 White House had been -- throughout the course of the time  
14 I was in the White House, one of my assignments was to  
15 maintain liaison with all outside groups. That would include  
16 all organized groups, like anything from League of Women  
17 Voters to the labor unions, to veterans' groups, what-have-you.

1 I spent a large part of my time, and my staff did, seeing  
2 people from outside groups who would come in and want to  
3 have discussions with the President, with the President's  
4 staff.

5 I was also responsible for forming or helping  
6 to form or encouraging the formation of outside groups that  
7 would support the policies that the President was following.  
8 For example, we formed a support group for the President's  
9 effort to get approval of the anti ballistics missile.  
10 We formed a support committee for economic policy.

11 Q How does that relate to the request by Mr.  
12 Ehrlichman for funds?

13 A I'm sorry, I gave you a long-winded answer.  
14 Because of this relationship with outside groups, I would  
15 often be the person that either Mr. Haldeman or Mr.  
16 Ehrlichman would call and ask if I could get funds for a  
17 particular -- usually for an outside project, but something  
18 that they wanted done.

19 In other words, a poll to be taken in connection  
20 with the A.B.M., I recall, the publication or the reprint  
21 of some materials that had been printed in the Reader's  
22 Digest.

23 I was often called and asked if I would be able  
24 to get someone to help finance a particular outside  
25 project.

26 Q Had Ehrlichman ever asked you to obtain funds  
27 for Mr. Krogh before?

28 A No.



1 Q This was a request for five thousand dollars?

2 A My best recollection is that the amount was  
3 five thousand, yes.

4 Q And you secured the five thousand dollars?

5 A No. I apparently -- I have had to go back and  
6 reconstruct this. I apparently called Mr. Baroody and asked  
7 if he could -- if he could get five thousand dollars, if he  
8 had it.

9 And he was the fellow at that particular point  
10 in time raising money for the committee for a new economic  
11 policy. He said he could.

12 And I asked if he would deliver it to Mr. Krogh's  
13 office, which he had subsequently told me that he did.

14 Q Did he tell you when he delivered it?

15 A No. His recollection, like mine, is that it  
16 was during this period of time, but the specific date we  
17 can't establish.

18 Q Do you recall whether there was any immediacy  
19 attached to the request of Mr. Ehrlichman in terms of that  
20 money?

21 A Well, it seems to me there was, but I'm not able  
22 to really be precise on what was said during that conversa-  
23 tion.

24 Q Do you recall whether or not there was any  
25 immediacy attached to your request to Mr. Baroody for  
26 obtaining that money?

27 A I would have conveyed the same immediacy that  
28 Mr. Ehrlichman conveyed to me. If it was "Get it today, if [8704]

1 you can," fine. If it was, "Get it tomorrow, we need it by  
2 tomorrow," or -- I just don't remember.

3 Q Did you ever talk to Mr. Krogh about that money?

4 A To the best of my knowledge, I did not.

5 Q Did you ever find out whether that money was  
6 repaid?

7 A Yes, I made arrangements for repaying that money  
8 through a committee in the District of Columbia, a political  
9 committee in the District of Columbia that was at that point  
10 raising funds, and it was repaid later -- late September,  
11 according to -- as I said, I have had to go back and reconstruct  
12 the events, but the money was repaid to Mr. Baroody in the  
13 latter part of September.



People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

John Ehrlichman

June 8, 1973



1 A Well, he was a staff assistant to Mr. Krogh, and  
2 I think he just continued in that capacity.

3 Q And in connection with Mr. Hunt's payroll source,  
4 what budget was that taken out of?

5 A I don't know. I've heard since that he was  
6 carried on Mr. Colson's payroll, but I don't know that.

7 Q Did it ever come to your attention that incidental  
8 funds were needed in connection with any of the activities  
9 of the special unit?

10 A Yes. I've heard that since.

11 Q Had you been acquainted with the need for such  
12 funds prior to the Labor Day weekend of 1971?

13 A I don't recall that I was.

14 Q Did you ever play any part in approving any  
15 expenditures of any member of that special unit -- and by  
16 special unit, I mean Krogh, Young, Liddy or Hunt -- prior to  
17 the Labor Day weekend of 1971?

18 A Would you say the first part of your question  
19 again?

20 MR. HECHT: Yes.

21 Would you read the question, please?

22 (Record read by the reporter.)

23 THE WITNESS: No. Now, let me go on, if I could, and  
24 amplify that.

Q BY MR. HECHT: Please.

A I have been asked in the fairly recent past if I recall a chain of circumstances where Mr. Krogh is supposed to have said to me, "I need travel expenses for Hunt and Liddy to go to the Coast and do this investigation. How do I arrange that?"

And I am supposed to have referred him to Mr. Colson. I don't have any recollection of that transaction. I can't say it didn't happen, but I have no present recollection of it.

And I don't recall any specific approval. I do know that there is no record of the travel expenses or the other provisions having been paid for out of my budget, out of the domestic budget of the White House, with the exception of a -- of a telephone.

And I want to -- I have to qualify my answer in that connection, because there is -- apparently, a telephone which Hunt had installed -- or Krogh had installed at Hunt's instance, or something of this kind -- in the Plumbers office.

This phone was paid for out of our Domestic Affairs budget. And so to that extent, and to the extent that I had delegated general authority to a man named Campbell to approve accounts, and he approved this account, paid for the telephone, I have some -- I had some participation in that transaction.

But only to that extent.

Q What office did the Plumbers Group operate out of, to your knowledge?



NOTE

Portions of the Grand Jury testimony of Egil Krogh have been separately distributed to Committee members.





NOTE

Portions of the Grand Jury testimony of David Young  
have been separately distributed to Committee members.





PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

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WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Phase I: Watergate Investigation

WASHINGTON, D.C., AUGUST 3, 6, 7; SEPTEMBER 24 AND 25, 1973

Book 9



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WASHINGTON : 1973



Senator WEICKER. You initially notified——

Mr. HUNT [continuing]. For our reconnaissance stay.

Senator WEICKER. I see.

Did you give a date certain as to when they should come to Los Angeles at that time or did you call from Los Angeles and request their presence?

Mr. HUNT. No, sir; the procedure was a little more complicated than that. Mr. Liddy and I returned from Los Angeles on or about August 27. We submitted a report of our findings and rather a detailed study which included photographs which had been developed for us and printed by the CIA, both internal and external photographs. There was a period of waiting while this report was being considered by Mr. Krogh and I now understand others.

Senator WEICKER. In other words, the preliminary report was submitted to Mr. Krogh.

Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. And when you say others who would that include?

Mr. HUNT. I assumed then and I assume now that Mr. Ehrlichman was also considering the report inasmuch as our findings were that a secure entry could be made and in fact was.

Senator WEICKER. Then who gave the final authorization to proceed with the actual break-in? You say you returned to Washington?

Mr. HUNT. Yes, sir.

Senator WEICKER. While these photographs were being developed, while consultation took place, and on whose instructions then did you return to Los Angeles for the actual break-in?

Mr. HUNT. Well, Mr. Liddy told me "It is go, you have got the green light."

I then communicated with my assistants in Florida and told them to be in Los Angeles at the Beverly Hilton Hotel, on a date certain, where we would converge and I would give them details of the operation, which they did not have at that point.

In addition there was a question of money, of financing. A certain budget had been drawn up. We reached a point when Mr. Liddy and I were waiting in room 16 for the funds for the operation to be produced.

Senator WEICKER. Room 16 being in the White House?

Mr. HUNT. The Plumbers room in the old Executive Office Building.

Senator WEICKER. In the old Executive Office Building.

Mr. HUNT. And time was growing very short in terms of the departure of our scheduled aircraft.

Almost at the last minute Mr. Krogh came in very hurriedly and handed an envelope to Mr. Liddy and said, "OK, here it is. Get going."

Mr. Liddy took the money, we left, took a taxi, went to the airport, flew to Chicago, made certain photographic purchases out there, overnight in Chicago. In the morning we flew to Los Angeles where we met with the men who had flown directly there from Miami.

Senator WEICKER. At the meeting at the Beverly Hilton Hotel then with the four Cuban-Americans, prior to their appearing in Los Angeles, they did not know the nature of the mission?

Mr. HUNT. They did not know the target of the mission.



— Df

AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH BAROODY

I, JOSEPH BAROODY, being duly sworn, hereby depose  
and say:

Since 1970 I have been employed in the public affairs consulting firm of Wagner and Baroody, 1100 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 712, Washington, D.C. The consulting services which my firm renders consist of representing clients affected by Federal Government actions.

From October, 1970, to January 1972, my firm was retained for consulting services by the Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated for a fee of \$2,500 per month. This consulting relationship was initiated with the assistance of the law firm of Reeves and Harrison of Washington, D.C., of which Marion Harrison, Esq. is a partner. I have met Mr. Marion Harrison on two or three occasions. Mr. Charles Colson, former special assistant to the President of the United States, was aware that my firm represented AMPI. It was my understanding that my firm was expected to look for ways in which we could advance the interests of AMPI. At no time, however, was I - or was any other person in my firm - connected in any way with, or aware of, any discussions between representatives of AMPI and the Administration concerning either milk price supports or possible contributions to the 1972 Presidential Campaign Fund.

I have been personally acquainted with Mr. Charles Colson for several years. In the latter part of August or the first part of September, 1971, Mr. Colson telephoned me and told me that the White House had an urgent need for \$5,000 and he asked me to lend him this amount for a short period of time. He did not tell me why the money was needed. I gathered this sum together from my personal funds (\$1,500 to \$2,000) and from funds (\$3,000 to \$3,500) which had previously been given to me by Mr. Colson's office to use in preparing television responses to a Common Cause statement on ending the war in Southeast Asia. The next day I put \$5,000 in an unmarked envelope and took it to Mr. Colson's office in the Executive Office Building. Mr. Colson told me to take the money to an office and give it to a person whom I would find there. I went to the office I had been told to go to and gave the money to a man whom I did not know but whom I now believe to have been Egil Krogh, Jr.

Two or three weeks afterwards, I received another telephone call from Mr. Colson's office. I was told that I could be repaid by going to Mr. George Webster, Esq., an attorney whose office was on Jefferson Place, N.W., in Washington, D.C. At the time I was wholly unaware that Mr. Webster was engaged in fund raising activities in connection with the President's re-election effort. Soon after receiving the call, I went to Mr. Webster's



office. He was not in. I identified myself to a receptionist who went to a nearby desk, opened a drawer and pulled out an unmarked envelope which she handed to me. The envelope contained \$5,000 in cash.

In June of 1972, Mr. Colson called me on the telephone and told me that it appeared that the \$5,000 might have been used to finance the September 1971 break-in of the offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, the psychiatrist of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. The purpose of Mr. Colson's call was to establish the date of the loan so as to determine whether, in fact, the funds could have been used for that purpose.

In the Spring of 1972 I received \$22,000 from Mr. Colson's office to place advertisements in several major newspapers throughout the United States supporting President Nixon's military directives in entering the country of Cambodia. Subsequently, the advertising project was suspended and this money was returned by me to Mr. Colson's office. Thereafter, it was decided that the advertisements would be placed on a smaller scale and I was given approximately \$6,800 with which to defray the costs of the reduced program.

The instances referred to previously herein are the only ones in which I have received White House funds.

From August of 1971 to the Spring of 1972, I worked with

a committee called "Citizens for a New Prosperity". Its function was to place advertisements and hold press conferences to build support for the economic policies embodied in the Economic Stabilization Act and Phases I and II. The Committee was bipartisan; its two principal officers were Hobart Lewis and former Treasury Secretary Fowler.

DATE: Jan 30, 1974

SIGNATURE Joseph Baroody

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30<sup>th</sup> day of January, 1974.

*My Commission expires*

DATE: Sept 14, 1976 Lida K. Terrell  
Notary Public



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

----- x  
COMMON CAUSE, et al.,  
                    Plaintiffs,  
                    v.  
FINANCE COMMITTEE TO RE-  
ELECT THE PRESIDENT, et  
al.,  
                    Defendants.  
----- x

Civil Action  
No. 1780-72

Washington, D. C.

Monday, December 24, 1973

Deposition of GEORGE DRURY WEBSTER, taken on behalf of  
the plaintiffs, pursuant to notice and agreement of counsel,  
on oral examination under the Rules of said Court, at the  
office of Webster & Kilcullen, 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue,  
N. W., Suite 1000, Washington, D. C., before Stephen S.  
Maxson, C.S.R., a notary public duly commissioned and  
qualified in and for the District of Columbia, commencing  
at approximately 10:40 a.m.



MR. ROGOVIN: No, we won't go into that then.

BY MR. ROGOVIN:

Q. In September of 1971 did you have a conversation with Charles Colson concerning the 5,000-dollar check that you believe was from T.A.P.E.?

A. I did.

Q. And where did the conversation take place?

A. Oh, I frankly don't recall where it took place.

Q. When, specifically, was the conversation?

A. The conversation was in the first part of September, that the -- the check was put in that account on the 7th of September, and that was all fairly simultaneous.

Q. Was anyone else aware, at the time, of the conversation that you had with Colson?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You didn't tell anyone of your conversation with Colson?

A. Not at that time. I've told -- the whole world has now been told about it.

Q. And what was the name of your secretary at that time?

A. Jane Horsley.

Q. What did Mr. Colson ask of you?

A. He wanted to know if any of those committees that I'd set up to receive funds for the Republican National Committee were still alive.

Q. What was your response?

A. I said, "One."

Q. What had happened to the other committees?

A. We had closed them out.

Q. You say "we." Who?

A. Me.

Q. You.

A. Probably I told my secretary to do it.

Q. Who had authority to write checks on the People United for Good Government Committee?

A. The bank records would show, but I know that I did.

Q. What did Mr. Colson ask you, if anything, after you indicated that one committee still existed?

A. He said he wanted to put a deposit in there.

Q. Did he tell you the purpose of the deposit?

A. He did not.

Q. Did he tell you what he wanted of you after the deposit was made?

A. He did not.

Q. When did you receive the check?

A. About the -- about September 7th.

Q. What did you do with the check?

A. Put it in the bank.

Q. Then what did you do?

A. Left it there.

Q. How long was the check in the bank?

A. The bank records show, I think, that the money was taken out on September 21.

Q. And what were the circumstances surrounding the taking out of the money?

A. The circumstances, as I recall them, were that Mr. Colson called me up and said he wanted five thousand dollars in cash, and so I wrote a check for five and put the money in my safe. While I was away he called up -- I suppose it was he -- or came over -- I don't know which one it was -- and told my secretary that there would be a Mr. Baroody that would be over and pick up the \$5,000.

Q. Were there any other funds in the account at the time, other than the five thousand?

A. None, to my knowledge, and also the records indicate there was nothing else in there.

Q. Did Mr. Colson tell you what the \$5,000 was to be used for?





Vol. 1

# The United States Senate

## Report of Proceedings

### Hearing held before

Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

SENATE RESOLUTION 60 - GENERAL INVESTIGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Tuesday, December 4, 1973

Washington, D. C.

DR

WARD & PAUL  
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

Retyped from indistinct original

Marion Harrison testimony, SSC Executive Session, December 4, 1973, 43-45.

or had organized for him, for projects that did not involve, directly involve monies to the re-election of certain candidates either in '70 or '72?

Mr. Harrison. I know of one, but my source of information is totally hearsay; namely, Mr. Robert Sale, who was one of the assistants, special prosecutors.

Mr. Weitz. Besides from what you have heard from either the prosecutor or what you have read in the paper, you know of nothing of any committees organized in behalf of Mr. Colson to receive contributions?

Mr. Harrison. No.

Mr. Weitz. On that point, did there not come a time in either August or September of 1971 when Mr. Colson requested a \$5,000 contribution from the dairy people? Asked of you to obtain a \$5,000 contribution of the dairy people?

Mr. Harrison. Well, the precise way you phrased it does not lend to a "yes" answer.

If I can rephrase it slightly, the answer will be yes.

That is the one Mr. Sale told me about.

Yes, there came a time sometime in 1971, about August, when Mr. Colson wanted to know if a dairy client, one of the trusts, would make a contribution to a committee, and he named the committee.

Mr. Schochet. What committee?

Mr. Harrison. I do not know; it was one of these nameless

retyped from indistinct original

ones.

Mr. Schochet. Would you recall if you were refreshed?

Mr. Harrison. I do not think I would.

Mr. Schochet. People United for Good Government?

Mr. Harrison. It could be; I am sure that it is one and the same committee I am going to testify to but I do not recall the precise name.

The committee had as its treasurer, had an address -- had as its treasurer George D. Webster, a very prominent Washington lawyer.

Mr. Colson either asked if that could be added to the list of committees or asked whether it could be contributed to, whatever way he phrased it. The net result was the same as asking me if I would recommend to the client that they make a contribution to that committee.

So I said, sure, and passed on the request to somebody in the client organization.

In due course, TAPE made a contribution of \$5,000 to that committee. I remember it very, very distinctly because George Webster has one of those little converted townhouse offices on Jefferson Place, N.W. Our law firm had thought of buying a building and converting it; I had the idea that I would take the check over to him and have him show me his office, which he did.

Except for that, I would not remember so distinctly.

Mr. Weitz. You delivered the check to Mr. Webster?

Mr. Harrison. Personally, I did.

Mr. Weitz. How did you receive the check?

Mr. Harrison. Independently.

I do not remember -- Mr. Sale of the prosecutor's office thinks he has it established that at the AMPI annual meeting in 1971, at which I was in attendance, along with 40,000 people and the President and everybody else, a great number of senators and congressmen, somebody handed it to me there.

Mr. Weitz. You do not remember that?

Mr. Harrison. I do not remember having it handed to me. It could have been handed me; someone could have brought it to the office; it could have been mailed to the office.

Mr. Weitz. Do you know to what purpose the money was put?

Mr. Harrison. I know what Mr. Sale told me.

Mr. Weitz. Did you know other than that?

Mr. Harrison. No.

I was pleased to get the name of a committee -- I thought Mr. Colson was doing us a favor -- which had a prominent lawyer as the treasurer and not some bank clerk at Union Trust.

I have nothing against bank clerks. I was very suspicious at the names of some of those committees that Mr. Lee Nunn had come up with, with bank clerks as treasurers. They were not organized as knowingly and thoroughly as they ought to



1 or had organized for him, for projects that did not involve,  
2 directly involve money to the re-election of certain candidate  
3 either in '70 or '72?

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22 trusts, would make a contribution to a committee, and he  
23 named the committee.

24 Mr. Schickel. Which committee?

25 Mr. Harrison. I do not know; it was one of these ad hoc

ones.

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22 I have nothing against bank clerks. I was very suspicious  
23 at the name of some of those committees that Mr. Leo Mann  
24 had come up with, with bank clerks as treasurers. They were  
25 not organized as knowingly and thoroughly as they ought to





72. On or about September 2, 1971 Hunt and Liddy flew to Chicago where they purchased cameras and walkie-talkies. Then they flew to Los Angeles where they met Barker, Martinez and DeDiego and purchased a crow bar, glass cutter, and other burglary tools. On the night of September 3, 1971, Barker, Martinez and DeDiego entered Dr. Fielding's office by breaking a first floor window of the building and breaking open the door to Dr. Fielding's second floor office. The file cabinets and desk in Dr. Fielding's office were broken into and searched. Liddy maintained a watch outside the building while Hunt, who was in communication by walkie-talkie, watched Dr. Fielding's residence. Barker, Martinez and DeDiego have testified that they did not locate any file on Ellsberg and that no information was obtained. Dr. Fielding has testified that his file cabinet had been broken into and the file on Ellsberg withdrawn.

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- 72.1 Bernard Barker testimony, 1 SSC 376.
- 72.2 E. Howard Hunt testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1973, 291-92, 298-99, 301-02 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.3 Felipe DeDiego testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 6, 1973, 191-99 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.4 Eugenio Martinez testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 5, 1973, 390 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury):
- 72.5 Lewis Fielding testimony, Grand Jury, People v. Ehrlichman, June 5, 1973, 93-94 (received from Los Angeles County Grand Jury).
- 72.6 Lewis Fielding affidavit, United States v. Russo, April 29, 1973.



PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972  
SENATE RESOLUTION 60

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

Phase I: Watergate Investigation

WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 17, 18, 22, 23, AND 24, 1973

Book 1



Printed for the use of the  
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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WASHINGTON : 1973

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concept, was perfectly qualified for a mission of this nature. I submitted their names and records to Mr. Hunt over the phone—long-distance phone—and some time after that, I do not remember, he called me and said that the two men had been cleared for the mission.

Senator GURNEY. Did he say who and how they were cleared?

Mr. BARKER. No, he did not.

Senator GURNEY. And then go on about the mission and be as brief as possible, because I want to get to the Watergate.

Mr. BARKER. Mr. Hunt then called me one day and said to proceed with my men to Los Angeles and to stay at—I think it was—the Beverly Wilshire Hotel where he would contact me. I bought the tickets, alerted the men, and we took off and went to Los Angeles. I registered in the hotel and Mr. Hunt contacted me. He gave me a brief—he gave me the address of the place where we were to make the entry. I found the place and I went with my men to familiarize myself with the area. I had the exact address at that time. Then the general plan was given to us. We proceeded to the area, and eventually made the entry. I personally searched for those documents.

Senator GURNEY. What documents?

Mr. BARKER. A file of Daniel Ellsberg at his psychiatrist's office. This file was not there. I would search—file from file cabinet. I searched his desk and the file cabinet. The men also helped me in the search. The only thing that I found in connection with him was an address book which had his name. This we photographed, and we also photographed the file cabinet to prove that we had forced them open, and then we left.

Senator GURNEY. Now then let us get to the Watergate: When and where did Mr. Hunt contact you about Watergate?

Mr. BARKER. I do not remember whether—I believe it was in one of the trips down to Miami that he told me of an impending operation—double operation—which would take in length about a week.

Senator GURNEY. Did you say double operation?

Mr. BARKER. I beg your pardon?

Senator GURNEY. Did you say double operation?

Mr. BARKER. That is correct.

Senator GURNEY. What does that mean?

Mr. BARKER. At that time, I did not know but I knew at the time it would involve, after that it was quite evident it was an entry into the McGovern's headquarters as well as an entry into the Watergate headquarters.

Senator GURNEY. Tell us now very carefully what his instructions were.

Mr. BARKER. I would like to explain that Mr. Hunt was our immediate superior in this operation—that we were involved only in the documents that we were to obtain. We had no connection with the electronic part. It is—to the best of my recollection—that the electronic part was not even under the direction of Mr. Hunt, much less of myself. Mr. McCord appeared to be quite capable of that, he handled that. I had no knowledge of that bugging he was going to do. All that my mission—that our team mission was—was the documents to which I have referred, and this was explained to me by Mr. Hunt at that time.





People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

E. Howard Hunt

June 6, 1973

this money?

A He was in the general area, sir, but I don't know that he actually saw the physical transfer take place.

Q All right. Where did the transfer take place?

A In the outer office of Room 16.

Q Did you have any parting words, last words with Mr. Young before you and Liddy left for Los Angeles again?

A Mr. Young?

Q Yes.

A I don't recall any, no, sir.

Q Prior to your departure from Washington, were any instructions given to you about notifying anybody about the success or failure of the Los Angeles mission?

A Not to me, no, sir.

Q To your knowledge -- or rather did Mr. Liddy ever make it known to you that he had engaged in such conversation?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did he make that known to you?

A As we were on our way to Dulles Airport.

Q Will you tell us what Mr. Liddy told you?

A Mr. Liddy told me that immediately upon the termination of the operation, whether it was a success or whether it was a failure, that he, by designated or by prearrangement, was to call Mr. Krogh at his home in Suburban Washington.

Q Are you sure he said Krogh, rather than Young?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Where did you go after you left Washington?



1 A We flew to Los Angeles.

2 Q Did you make any stopover in Chicago?

3 A I beg your pardon, we did. We did. We flew  
4 directly to Chicago.

5 Q Why did you go to Chicago?

6 A We went to Chicago to purchase a Minolta camera  
7 and walkie-talkies.

8 Q Why couldn't that material have been obtained in  
9 Washington?

10 A It could have been.

11 Q Why wasn't it?

12 A Too close to the origin of the operation.

13 Q Who actually purchased the items?

14 A Mr. Liddy had control of the funds. He purchased  
15 the items.

16 Q And did I understand you to say walkie-talkies were  
17 purchased?

18 A Yes, sir.

19 Q What part was it contemplated that the walkie-  
20 talkies would play in the forthcoming event?

21 A Communication among the members of the team.

22 Q What else was purchased?

23 A In Chicago?

24 Q Yes.

25 A A Minolta camera.

26 Q Did you have any other camera with you as you and  
27 Mr. Liddy left Washington for Chicago?

28 A Not to the best of my recollection, no.



I had said I knew where Dr. Ellsberg was. That was a misstatement. That should have been Dr. Fielding.

Q All right. Did you, in fact, know where Dr. Fielding was?

A I did not at that juncture, no.

Q Was any effort made to determine that?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do in that regard?

A We made some pretext telephone calls.

Q What conclusions were reached after doing that?

A That Dr. Fielding was in the area.

Q What knowledge did you have with respect to the vulnerability of Dr. Fielding's office building during nighttime hours?

A Our initial reconnaissance indicated that both the front and rear doors of the building of the professional building were open during the char forces access to the building, that is to say, anyone coming from the street could walk through the building and exit to the rear and then advance into the parking area.

We had observed, Mr. Liddy and I, in our initial reconnaissance, that those doors were kept open as late as 1:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q All right. Will you tell us what happened, then, after you made the reconnaissance and after you engaged in the telephone calls to determine the whereabouts of Dr. Fielding?

A Well, we went into the logistics. We purchased

1 deliverymen's uniforms locally.

2 Q Was that to be used in the delivery of the valise  
3 situation?

4 A Yes, sir.

5 Q Okay.

6 A Purchased them. Purchased surgical gloves, I  
7 believe, also regular work gloves for the two men who were  
8 to make the entry. Purchased what would be called burglar  
9 tools in case we had to force, a glass cutter, masking tape,  
10 that sort of thing. Purchased a long length of nylon cord  
11 which was to be attached to the window in Dr. Fielding's  
12 suite and flung outside in case an emergency exit had to  
13 be made.

14 We then regrouped in the Beverly Hilton Hotel,  
15 went over the operation plan again, checked out each item  
16 of equipment from the checkoff list, and decided that all  
17 signs were go for that night.

18 Q Were any identifying labels or stickers placed  
19 upon the valise or suitcase?

20 A Yes, sir.

21 Q For what purpose?

22 A To persuade the char persons that this was a  
23 legitimate air express delivery.

24 Q Was Mr. De Diego in personal contact with you  
25 or Mr. Liddy for a great deal of the time that you spent  
26 here in Los Angeles?

27 A No, sir.

28 Q Did you work through Mr. Barker as intermediary?

1 Q What was the plan as to when to tell the persons  
2 who would actually make the entry into Dr. Fielding's office  
3 what it is they were to look for?

4 A That was to be done immediately that Mr. Liddy  
5 determined that the local situation immediately around the  
6 office building would permit an entry.

7 Q What happened then, sir?

8 A I went out to -- drove out to Dr. Fielding's  
9 residence, took up a position out there, surveilled his  
10 apartment building for a time; checked by walkie-talkie with  
11 the team; indicated that there was no problem.

12 I got out of the car, walked up the alley, saw  
13 the lights were on in his apartment, returned to my car.  
14 After a while, the lights went out in Dr. Fielding's apartment  
15 building -- in his apartment, rather; strike that -- and I  
16 waited there a while longer, till I was satisfied that  
17 the Fieldings were in for the night.

18 Then I drove back to the area of Dr. Fielding's  
19 office.

20 Q What was your expectation as to what Mr. Liddy  
21 would be doing during the time you've just related to us,  
22 when you were surveilling Dr. Fielding's apartment?

23 A While I was out there?

24 Q Yes, sir.

25 A That he would be giving the team its final  
26 briefing.

27 Q Did you maintain walkie-talkie contact with Mr. Liddy at all during this period of time?



1           A       Well, we had four walkie-talkies. I maintained  
2 contact with -- I think with everyone who had one.

3           Q       Where did you go after you left the area around  
4 Dr. Fielding's apartment house?

5           A       Once I had satisfied myself that there was nothing  
6 of an unusual nature transpiring there -- for example, no  
7 concentration of police cars, no drunken fights going on in  
8 the area, no disturbances that would be likely to attract  
9 the police, no groups hanging around the nearby gas station  
10 and so forth, I communicated this to Mr. Liddy, who was in  
11 stationary surveillance behind the building.

12           Then I withdrew to the Beverly Hilton Hotel, opened  
13 the window of the room in which I was staying -- which gave  
14 out -- or, which had line of sight access, a line of sight  
15 view to the office area, and I stood by the walkie-talkie,  
16 and simply spent the rest of the evening there.

17           Q       The stationery surveillance that you made reference  
18 to with respect to Mr. Libby, was that to be done on foot or  
19 in a car?

20           A       In a car.

21           Q       Why?

22           A       Well, a single man lurking in the shadows at  
23 midnight, I would guess -- in Beverly Hills, at least -- is  
24 obviously an object of some suspicion.

25           Q       How far away was Mr. Liddy supposed to be from  
26 Dr. Fielding medical building at the time of this stationary  
27 surveillance?

A       Well this was up to him.





People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

Felipe DeDiego

June 6, 1973

Q Now, after the woman left, then what did you do?

A Uh -- we went -- we checked both doors, in front and the one in the rear, and both were locked.

So, we had to break a window.

Q When you say "we," was that you, Mr. Barker, and Mr. Martinez?

A Right, that's correct.

Q And can you tell us who broke the window?

A I believe Mr. Martinez and myself did it.

Q Do you remember how it was broken?

A How?

Q Yes.

A We placed some masking tape to avoid the noise, and we hit the glass with the -- with our hands, I believe.

Q Was a glass cutter used?

A It was, but it didn't work.

Q I am showing you now Photograph Exhibit Number 10. Do you recognize this as the parking lot behind the building where the window was broken?

A Right. Right.

Q And I am showing you now Exhibit Number 16, being pointed out by Mr. Burnett. Does that look like the window that you broke?

A Right, right.

Q Now, when you broke that window, in order to go in the building, did you know what you were going in to do?

A To do at that time?

Q Yes.



A Well, we -- we knew that we had to get inside the doctor's office.

Q Had you been told when you entered what you were going in to do in the doctor's office?

A No. It was told by Barker at that time, when we get inside the doctor's office.

Q Now, you saw some cameras in this suitcase that was put in there earlier; is that correct?

A Right.

Q Had anybody told you that you were going to photograph any papers in the doctor's office?

A Some paper, but we didn't know what kind of paper.

Q Were you told before you went in that you were going to take anything from the doctor's office?

A No, not before.

Q All right. Then when you broke the window, tell us what you did with your two partners.

A We went up to the second floor where the office is and --

Q I take it you climbed in through the window?

A Right. We did.

Q Did you do anything in the office that you got in, after climbing through the window, at all?

A Uhh -- I believe, because of -- it was so dark, that we bumped -- we -- we dropped some books or something.

Q Knocked over some things?

A That's right.

Q Then you went through that office into that hall, <sup>[8751]</sup>



2a3 1 and you went up to the second floor?

2 A That's right.

3 Q Who led the way?

4 A Uhh -- could be either one, Martinez or myself.

5 Barker was behind.

6 Q You had been there before, to deposit the  
7 suitcase, as had Mr. Barker; is that right?

8 A Pardon, sir?

9 Q You had been there earlier that night to deposit  
10 the suitcase?

11 A Right.

12 Q And what did you do when you got upstairs?

13 A Well, the door that was supposed to be open was  
14 locked, so we have to force the door and get in.

15 Q Now, was that the door right out into the hallway  
16 from the office?

17 A Right.

18 Q Showing you Exhibit Number 19, a photograph,  
19 with Suite Number "212" and "Lewis J. Fielding" showing,  
20 does this look like the hallway door that you went in through?

21 A Right.

22 Q Do you remember how you got in through that door?  
23 How it was forced?

24 A With the -- I -- I can't say in English. I don't  
25 know the name.

26 Q A pry bar (indicating)?

27 A Right. Correct.

28 Q Were you wearing any gloves to avoid leaving [8752]

fingerprints?

A We did.

Q Then I take it you got in Dr. Fielding's office?

A Right.

Q Did anybody tell you after you got inside what you were there to do?

A Well, at that time, Barker told us, "We are here because we are doing a great job for the country. And we have to find some paper of a great traitor to the United States, which is an s.o.b., and he's -- and which will help enemies of this country."

So we asked who was the guy, and he said, "Daniel Ellsberg."

Q You asked who the guy was, and he said Daniel Ellsberg?

A Right.

Q Did you know who Daniel Ellsberg was at that time?

A Of course.

Q By the way, did you think you were working for the United States Government at this time?

A Yes. No question about it.

Q Now, after he told you you were after papers on Daniel Ellsberg, what did you do inside the office?

A We tried to find papers, and we -- I mean, I did not find any.

Q Did you break anything open inside the office --

A We did.

Q -- to look for papers?

A We did.

Q What did you break open?

A Those metal cabinets.

Q And did you use the pry bar to get in the  
cabinets?

A Right.

Q I take it they were locked; is that right?

A They were locked, right.

3-1 1 Q And did you look through the files in the cabinets?

2 A That's correct.

3 Q What were you looking for, you, yourself?

4 A I was looking for any paper with the name of  
5 Daniel Ellsberg on it.

6 Q Did you see any name of Daniel Ellsberg on  
7 anything?

8 A I did not.

9 Q Did anybody take any photographs while you  
10 were inside the office?

11 A We did.

12 Q Who did that?

13 A I believe Mr. Martinez did it.

14 Q Do you remember how many cameras you had?

15 A I am not quite sure, but I believe we had two,  
16 one Polaroid and one.-- another one. I am not familiar with  
17 the cameras.

18 Q Were these taken out of the suitcase after you  
19 broke in?

20 A That's right.

21 Q And Mr. Martinez took photographs?

22 A Yes. And I also take with the Polaroid. I did  
23 with the Polaroid.

24 Q What did you take photographs of with the  
25 Polaroid camera?

26 A Why, you mean?

27 Q What did you take photographs of?

28 A Well, what I did take was a picture of inside a



3-2 1 drawer in order to leave that drawer the same way that we  
2 found it.

3 Q In other words, you opened the drawer. Was this  
4 a file drawer?

5 A A desk drawer.

6 Q Desk drawer. And you took a Polaroid shot so  
7 that after you went through it, you could put it back the  
8 way it was?

9 A That's correct.

10 Q Was this after you had already broken in the  
11 file cabinets?

12 A I don't remember.

13 Q What did you, yourself, go through looking for  
14 Dr. Ellsberg's files?

15 A I beg your pardon?

16 Q What did you look through, looking for Dr.  
17 Ellsberg's files?

18 A Any paper with the name of Dr. Ellsberg on it.

19 Q Did you look at the files in the cabinets?

20 A Anywhere. We looked anywhere.

21 Q Did you ever see anything with Dr. Ellsberg's  
22 name on it?

23 A I did not.

24 Q Did you see any envelopes with Dr. Ellsberg's  
25 name on it?

26 A I did not.

27 Q Did anybody tell you that they had found Dr.  
28 Ellsberg's files while you were in that office? [8756]

3-3 1 A No, sir.

2 Q How many photographs did you see Mr. Martinez take?

3 A Four or five.

4 Q Did you see what he was photographing?

5 A Well, we took all of the files and the desk and  
6 some papers.

7 Q Were any of these papers Dr. Ellsberg's papers?

8 A No.

9 Q Could you see them well enough to be able to tell  
10 us?

11 A Yes, I think so.

12 Q And they did not look like Dr. Ellsberg's papers?

13 A Did not.

14 Q Did Mr. Barker ever say, "Here is Dr. Ellsberg's  
15 papers"?

16 A He never said that.

17 Q Did anybody take anything from the office when  
18 you left?

19 A No, we don't.

20 Q Did you, yourself, take anything from the office?

21 A No, I don't.

22 Q Approximately how long were you and your  
23 partners in this doctor's office?

24 A I would say from thirty to forty-five minutes.

25 Q Were you interrupted by anybody during that time?

26 A No, we don't.

27 Q Now, you say you took some photographs so that  
28 you could straighten up after you looked through the office. [8757]

3-4 1 Did you straighten up after you looked through everything?

2 A No, we don't.

3 Q Why not?

4 A Well, I don't know. Barker didn't say anything.  
5 He said, "Okay, now we have to leave," and we left.

6 Q Was the place pretty much of a mess when you left?

7 A It was.

8 Q Mr. De Diego, we have had some indication that  
9 there may have been two large documents containing as many  
10 as twenty pages in these file cabinets with Dr. Ellsberg's  
11 name on them. Did you see anything like that while you  
12 were looking through these files, sir?

13 A I did not.

14 Q Do you have any explanation for the fact that  
15 you may not have seen these in the files, assuming they were  
16 there?

17 A I don't know, because that is a small place and  
18 I should see anything.

19 Q In other words, if they were there, you think  
20 you would have seen them?

21 A I think so, yes.

22 Q About what time did you leave?

23 A Close to midnight.

24 Q And where did the three of you go from there?

25 A We went back to the hotel.

26 Q Did you meet with anybody on the way back to the  
27 hotel?

28 A I did not.







People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 388)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

Eugenio Martinez

June 5, 1973

1 Q How long did you stay in Dr. Fielding's office?

2 A There was no time schedule. And when you are  
3 running this kind of an operation, believe me, it always  
4 looks longer than what it is. So I couldn't tell you  
5 exactly. But it could be more than an your, hour and a half.  
6 Because we looked through all the cabinets.

7 Q Didn't find anything?

8 A Oh, the only thing they found, when we have  
9 everything back up, we saw the telephone book. We push in  
10 "Ellsberg," and there was the name. And I believe that I  
11 took a picture, just to have something.

12 (Laughter.)

13 THE WITNESS: No, let me explain. In my -- it might  
14 look funny. But when you are engaged in an operation, and  
15 there's a lot of risk involved -- and look where we are now --  
16 and all our operation have been the same.

17 I can tell you, I have more than three hundred  
18 operation into Cuba, in which my life have been risked.

19 But your success is when you come and you say,  
20 "Operation successful."

21 When you come with nothing is really sad, after  
22 all the thing that you expose. And it's really --

23 Q I'm sure we understand that. And we appreciate  
24 the risks involved, Mr. Martinez.

25 A No, no. I am saying: I'm not talking about the  
26 risks. I'm talking about being -- how successful the  
27 operation.

28 Q Did you -- where did you go after you left Dr. <sup>[8761]</sup>





People v. Ehrlichman, et al. (A 300 381) —

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

Lewis Fielding

June 5, 1973



Did you, within the file, have documents or things that had been furnished to you besides what you may have put in there yourself?

A Yes, communication between the patients and myself.

Q But you also had certain things that you wrote on?

A Yes.

Q And all I'm trying to establish, Doctor, is that that paper has some -- it cost some money.

A Right.

Q Even if it had no writing on it?

A Right.

Q And I take it you never had any information from Dr. Ellsberg or anybody else that you should violate that privileged communication of patient and physician?

A No, sir.

Q Even to this day?

A Even to this day.

Q Did you save the documents that you had on Dr. Ellsberg after that period of time? You still have those, sir?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, would it be possible to look at the Ellsberg envelope that you previously described in the drawer to determine whether it had been opened? I mean would it have a seal on it or anything like that, or is it just the security of the metal file itself?

A No, the document was unsealed, so it was only the

94

1 security of the file.

2 Q So there would be no way to look at the papers  
3 themselves to see if there had been an actual intrusion  
4 and removal and then perhaps being put back?

5 A Oh, yes, there was, because these papers, as I  
6 found them, were outside the envelope. I know that I had  
7 left them inside the envelope. Beyond that, there was  
8 evidence that these papers -- you know, again -- if you have  
9 been with a file long enough and lived with it, you know  
10 what your papers look like. And this looked as if it had  
11 been fingered, had been fingered over, you know, people had  
12 done something with it, you know.

13 Q It was not in the same condition that you had  
14 left it the last time that you had handled it, is that correct?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Is that a fair statement?

17 A Yes, it is.

18 Q Now, was the fourth drawer of the filing cabinet  
19 where you saw the Ellsberg papers, is that where you normally  
20 kept them?

21 A Yes, sir.

22 Q And did you call that at that time to anybody's  
23 attention, or was this just a personal observation that you  
24 made with reference to the Ellsberg file?

25 A This is personal observation. And, you know,  
26 while I can talk -- you know, I have had a lot of time to  
27 sort of put it together since then, and so it seems, you know,  
28 a little simpler now. But at that time it was not so





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11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

12 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )  
14 Plaintiff, )  
15 vs. )  
16 ANTHONY JOSEPH RUSSO, JR., )  
17 DANIEL ELLSBERG, )  
18 Defendants. )

NO. 9373-WMB-CD

AFFIDAVIT OF LEWIS J. FIELDING, M.D.

19 STATE OF CALIFORNIA )  
20 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) ss.

21 I, LEWIS J. FIELDING, being duly sworn depose and say:

22 I am a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine in  
23 the State of New York in 1937 and in the State of California in  
24 1949. My office is located at 450 North Bedford, Beverly Hills,  
25 California.

26 I am and have been since 1938 a psychiatrist; since  
27 1949 I have specialized in psychoanalysis. I am certified in  
28 both psychiatry and neurology. I am a member of the American  
29 Psychiatric Association, the American Psychoanalytical Associa-  
30 tion, the American Medical Association and other professional  
31 organizations.

[8767]

32 For some time prior to July, 1970, Dr. Ellsberg was



one of my patients. I have seen him on a few occasions since.

On July 20, 1971, at approximately 10:30 a.m. there was a knock on the door of my office leading from the waiting room to the consultation room. Upon responding I found two men who stated that they were agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and showed me their official identification cards. One of them was Richard C. Kilcourse; the other agent gave his name but I did not take particular notice of it. The agents stated that they wished to talk to me. They advised me that they wished to talk to me about Dr. Ellsberg. I told them that I could not have any discussions with them until I consulted my lawyer. They departed with the understanding that I would telephone Mr. Kilcourse to advise him of my decision.

On July 22, 1971, after consultation with my attorney, I decided that I should not discuss my patient or his affairs and asked my attorney to so advise Mr. Kilcourse.

On July 26, 1971, I received a telephone call from a Mr. Morehead, who described himself as an F.B.I. agent. I believe, although I am not positive, that he was the agent who accompanied Mr. Kilcourse on the July 20, 1971 visit with me. Mr. Morehead asked me what decision I had reached with respect to the agents' request of July 20, 1971 for a discussion with me about my patient. I told him that my attorney had contacted Mr. Kilcourse concerning my decision. Mr. Morehead then told me that Mr. Kilcourse was no longer on the case. Accordingly, I gave Mr. Morehead my attorney's name and telephone number and I am advised that Mr. Morehead or some other representative of the F.B.I. communicated with my attorney and was told of my decision.

On Saturday, September 4, 1971 at approximately 9:00 a.m., during the Labor Day weekend while I was at my home, I was

1 telephoned by Officer Bottleman of the Beverly Hills Police  
2 Department. Officer Bottleman informed me that my office had  
3 been broken into and that a police officer was present in  
4 my office checking into the matter.

5 I called Mr. Wakeman, the general manager of the build-  
6 ing, and he suggested that I come to the building. I drove  
7 down to the office with my wife, Elizabeth, and found my  
8 papers and records strewn about. A police officer, a Mr.  
9 Brickley, Shield #603, of the Beverly Hills Police Department,  
10 was present and was checking the office for fingerprints.

11 I observed that the locks on my office doors had been  
12 pried open and that the wood part of the door near the lock  
13 had been hacked away. I also observed that the locks on my  
14 wood cabinet and on my steel filing cabinet behind it had  
15 also been pried open and bent completely out of shape. These  
16 cabinets contained information and records concerning my  
17 patients including Dr. Ellsberg. The files in my cabinet  
18 were in considerable disarray. My personal papers, including  
19 those pertaining to Dr. Ellsberg, appeared to have been thor-  
20 oughly rummaged through.

21 I then learned some of the facts as to the actual break-  
22 in from Mr. Efrain Martinez, the cleaning man. He told me the  
23 following story in the presence of my wife, Elizabeth, the  
24 maintenance superintendent, Mr. J.C. Boone, and Officer Brickley:  
25 On the previous night, September 3, while Mr. Martinez was at  
26 his night job at about 11:00 p.m. cleaning up the building, two  
27 men arrived at the building. Mr. Martinez said that they were  
28 wearing uniforms, somewhat like those of a postman or United  
29 Parcel Post delivery man and they were carrying a large suitcase.  
30 He said that they talked in an accent which he recognized to  
31 be Cuban and that he would know such an accent. They told him  
32 that they were supposed to deliver the suitcase to me. While Mr

1 Martinez thought this somewhat unusual, he permitted them to  
2 enter my office and believed that they had left the suitcase  
3 in my office.

4 I, of course, had made no arrangements for that or  
5 any other delivery. I had expected no suitcase and found no  
6 suitcase on my arrival at my office in response to the call  
7 from Officer Bottleman.

8 As I looked over the office I attempted to do some re-  
9 arranging. I could not tell what was missing, although the  
10 incoming Saturday mail which was usually neatly stacked on  
11 my desk by the cleaning people was not there and never turned  
12 up. My wife and I left the office at approximately 10:45 p.m.  
13 in considerable distress.

14 I contacted the Beverly Hills Police Department several  
15 weeks later to find out if they had any further information  
16 regarding the break-in. I was advised that they did not. With  
17 this exception, from the time of the break-in until the present,  
18 I have not been contacted by anyone nor have I contacted anyone  
19 (with the exception of my counsel whom I spoke with immediately  
20 after the weekend of the break-in) regarding this matter until  
21 Friday, April 27, 1973.

22 On that day, Dr. Ellsberg telephoned my office and  
23 informed me that the Court had informed him of a Government  
24 report of a break-in at the office of a psychiatrist of Dr. Ells-  
25 berg. I could not speak to Dr. Ellsberg in any detail at  
26 that time since I was with a patient. Later that day when Dr.  
27 Ellsberg telephoned me again, I confirmed the fact of the break-  
28 in.

29 The next day I received a telephone call from Dr. Ellsberg  
30 and his counsel, Leonard B. Boudin. Mr. Boudin requested a  
31 meeting with me and such a meeting occurred in my attorney's [8770]  
office on Saturday afternoon, April 28, 1973. The meeting was



1 attended by my attorneys, Harry B. Swardlow and Irving A.  
2 Shimer, Mr. Boudin, Dr. Ellsberg and myself at which time I  
3 related the foregoing facts.

4  
5  
6 Lewis J. Fielding  
7 LEWIS J. FIELDING, M.D.

8 Subscribed and sworn to before  
9 me this 29th day of April, 1973.

10  
11 Irving A. Shimer  
12  
13 Notary Public in and for Said County  
14 and State.

